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ABSTRACT
This study examines the extent to which development aid encourages or sup-
presses violence, using the Nepalese Civil War (2000-2006) as a case study. The
effect of aid is analyzed at an aggregate level, by sector, and by concentration
levels using rich geo-coded data at the district level. Findings indicate that at
the aggregated level, development aid has an insignificant effect on violence;
while certain sectors and concentration levels of development aid significantly
can encourage or reduce violence. Aid is regarded in the literature to act as a
suppressor of conflict if it increases the opportunity cost to rebel and an encour-
ager of conflict or as a rent which fuels rebel initiatives. This study indicates that
development aid can effectively increase the opportunity cost to rebel, but can
be seen as a rent or is perhaps poorly executed if aid is spent in the education or
energy sector or is distributed at a low level of funding per capita.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A civil war is perhaps one of the most impactful events on a nation’s history
and economy and has remnants of its effects long after ceasefire. There is a dis-
puted argument in the development literature how development aid may fuel
or inhibit violence during conflict. This study will examine the last six years of
the Nepalese Civil War which occurred from 1996-2006 and claimed the lives
of over 17,800 people (1% < of 2006 population). Of the 3,840 major attacks on
public property facilities, there is an estimated loss of over $8.89 billion 2016
Nepalese Rupees ($83.113 million in 2016 USD). According to the Asian Devel-
opment Bank, the destruction of the Civil War caused the country to forgo 3%
in GDP growth (Ra and Singh 2005).
The development literature views development aid in conflict events under two
frameworks: (1) a way that can increase the opportunity cost of violence or (2)
a rent that attracts rebels to engage in violence due to payoffs from victory.
In order to test which view of development aid is more correct, I define three
hypotheses in response to my three research questions with corresponding em-
pirical strategies:
I formulate the following hypotheses for my study based on my research ques-
tions:
1. To what extent did the presence of development aid projects suppress or
2
encourage violence during the Nepalese Civil War (2000-2006)?
2. To what extent did different types of aid-sector-based development
projects suppress or encourage violence during the Nepalese Civil War
(2000-2006)?
3. To what extent did different levels of aid concentration suppress or en-
courage violence during the Nepalese Civil War (2000-2006)?
I first provide a literature review discussing the development aid and conflict
literature. I follow by introducing my hypotheses and the data I use to test
them. I define my empirical strategy for each hypothesis and discuss my corre-
sponding preliminary findings. Changing my estimator type, I re-estimate my
empirical strategies and discuss this in my robustness testing and various ways
I test the exogeneity of aid assignment. I then discuss my results all together
and discuss my study’s contributions to the literature and future studies.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Understanding Conflict: Greed and Grievance vs. Rent
Seeking Models
The theories that explain how economic factors may affect or form civil conflicts
typically sort into two competing ideologies. The first, defined by the seminal
papers of Collier (2001 and Hoeffler 2004) defines the motivations for rebels to
take up arms and become combatants in civil warfare. The model distinguishes
by factors motivating greed and those motivating grievances, but Collier (1998)
finds economic factors related to grievance to lead to more instances of conflict.
The greed model believes combatants perform a cost-benefit model, whereby
conflicts begin due to rebels desiring to seize funds that will allow them to
continue fighting. These factors include lootable resources, which has caused
an emergence of studies linking natural resource dependence to conflict onset.
Weak states, or other conditions that favor insurgencies (not to be confused with
ethnic or religious characteristics) can cause natural resources to be compro-
mised by rebels (Fearon 2004). Likewise, the presence of natural resources can
increase the benefit of a successful rebellion (Fearon 2003). However, the former
framework is critiqued as these analyses are conducted using macro-level data
to understand what is arguably micro-level behavior (Sambanis 2004).
This contrasts to rent-seeking models, whereby a government and rebel move-
ment attempts to gain control of the resources of the state, but this is because
4
they maximize their expected payoffs, net of the cost of engaging in conflict.
The larger the potential pie to be won [creates a] greaterincentive to engage
in warfare (Arcand and Chauvet 2001). Therefore in contrast to the greed and
grievance framework which views conflict as an equilibrium phenomena and
not an objective, rent-seeking behavior motivates rebels to continue acquiring
rents to ensure their survival because of expected payoffs. In contrast to greed
models, which argue rebels, continue engaging in warfare because of the re-
sources available, rent-seeking models argue rebels continue engaging in war-
fare to increase their probability of survival (Neary 1997).
Both frameworks have been adopted in the conflict economics literature and
do serve a role in understanding how a resource such as development aid can
be framed as a rent or financial resource to motivate the onset of fighting or
help fuel the continuation of fighting. Additionally, these frameworks both ac-
knowledge the importance of socioeconomic factors, which can affect conflict.
For the purposes of this literature, I adopt the latter framework which situ-
ates the Nepalese Civil War as a rent-seeking behavior model. This is in part
due to the rich micro-data available, but also due the motivation of the Maoist
rebels. It is documented that the Maoist rebels wished to overthrow the govern-
ment, and were motivated to engage in conflict to transform the constitutional
monarchy. Their goal for altering the political landscape of Nepal required their
survival, and I believe motivates their engagement in conflict through a rent-
seeking framework more accurately. Since development aid plays a significant
role in the many GDPs of developing countries, it may implicitly motivate the
continuation of conflict. Likewise, since development aid can also increase the
opportunity cost for rebellion, it may disincentive individuals to engage in war-
5
fare.
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2.2 Opportunity Cost and The Role of Aid in Conflict
The opportunity cost of joining a rebellion or overthrowing a government has
been of interest to development and conflict economists. One of the widely ac-
cepted hypotheses within the literature is that countries with lower per capita
incomes are more likely to engage in civil conflict (Collier 1998, et al. 2004;
Fearon and Latin 2003; Blattman and Miguel, 2010). It is argued that impover-
ished individuals have a lower opportunity cost to rebel compared to wealthier
individuals causing more conflict to occur in developing rather than developed
countries. For this reason, there is an explored, but rather disputed underlying
mechanism which links rising incomes and quality of life to the deterrence of
civil conflict. Although Chassang and Padro (2009) and others do not accept
this hypothesis, they do find a tangential positive relationship between the ex-
posures to negative income shocks on causing conflict. Similarly, Berman et al.
(2011), who frames the analysis of opportunity cost in regards to the unemploy-
ment rate, finds that the unemployed have a low opportunity cost of engaging
in civil strife.
Before entering the discussion of aid and its relationship to violence further, it
should be noted that Bozzoli et al. (2013) find that programs can be effectively
implemented in conflict zones with a few modifications.
The literature often elucidates the opportunity cost of joining a rebellion or en-
gaging in conflict through formulating a quasi-natural experiment, using de-
velopment aid as a treatment (Crost and Johnston 2010, Dasgupta 2016, Sexton
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2015). Whereby, development programs arguably increase rents, but also the in-
comes and standards of living of individuals, which raises the opportunity cost
of rebellion. This new economic disincentive to rebel is often tied to the notion of
contract theory whereby aid can cause citizens to foresee their governments as
upholding the social contract. Similarly, not only can development aid increase
incomes, it can also win hearts and minds, whereby citizens are satisfied with
and loyal to their leaders through these development public works and as a re-
sult, suppress any desires of rebellion. In fact, a study by Arcand and Wouabe
(2009) finds in the Angolan Civil War that the Angolan government used aid as
a way to deter violence by targeting aid to areas that were close in proximity
to fighting. Arcand believes this was in order to create a sort of nationalistic
buffer zone, which reaffirms arguments of opportunity cost and contract the-
ory. A shortfall of this study though is that it is unknown if the targeting of aid
actually deterred conflict from occurring or reduced violence.
Studies on aid and conflict differ in findings though, which illustrates the in-
conclusive nature of how development aid programs channel to deterring or
increasing conflict and the inherent need for better data and, in general, better
spatial models (Blattman and Miguel 2010, Raleigh 2010). It should be noted
that although there is an accepted link between poverty and inequality on con-
flict, there lacks a consensus on theories explaining how development aid poli-
cies deter conflict. An important distinction to be made is while development
aid is used as a blanket statement, conflict studies typically frame aid in a par-
ticular context, such as the nature of the project (i.e. education vs. health), its
fungibility, its donors, or even its executers (i.e. NGOs vs. government bodies).
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For instance, Savun and Tirone (2011) finds democracy aid to be an effective
tool in suppressing the risk of conflict. However in contrast, a study by Nunn
and Qian (2013) finds a positive link between food aid and the duration and
incidence of conflict. While Dube and Naidu (2015) finds military aid in Colom-
bia to have no effect in guerrilla attacks, but does increase the occurrence of
paramilitary homicides. These three types of aid are documented to have a
variable degree in fungibility, increasing likelihood it can be pillaged by rebels
(Strandow 2014).
Some studies highlight the potential for blanket development aid to deter vio-
lence, but vary the impact aid can have conditional on how well the state imple-
ments and secures the funds of projects (Crost and Johnston 2010, Dasgupta et
al. 2016). Likewise studies on the same country display competing findings on
how aid impacts violence. For example, Beath et al. (2011) finds that aid projects
in Afghanistan may win over the hearts of individuals, but this does not nec-
essarily translate to safer and more secure areas. Berman et al. (2013) echoes
this finding; aid projects are successful to deter violence only when community
members value the projects and the implementation relies on the behavior of
non-combatants.
In contrast, another study actually finds that aid actually incentives counterin-
surgency, whereby aid is ruled an ineffective measure in deterring rebels in con-
tested arenas, ultimately increasing conflict (Sexton 2015). This notion of coun-
terinsurgency in response to aid is found in work of Crost and Johnston (2010).
He finds in the Philippines that unlike provinces that were ineligible for devel-
opment projects, provinces that were barely eligible for aid have large increases
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in casualties.
Other research tries to link and consider the opportunity cost of recruitment
and the effectiveness of recruitment in tandem with income levels, natural re-
source levels, or ethnic fragmentation (Gates 2002, Weinstein 2005, Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol 2005, Kalyvas 2008, Wood 2010). For example, Kuhn and
Weidmann (2013) finds the opportunity cost of recruitment is much lower for
rebels if the civil war is ethnic-based versus income based. The reason behind
this is due to the collective action that may occur if rebels are composed of com-
peting identities, essentially people of a rebelling ethnicity are ”automatically”
recruited. Furthermore, the difference in the motivations for war and their fuel-
ing be they anti-colonial, ethnic, or natural resource funded can have an impact
on the length of the war (Fearon 2004, Chassang and Padro 2010).
Additionally, these studies shed light onto the competing yet complementary
narratives on how poverty and ethnicity affect the onset and duration of con-
flict. For example, are individuals poor because of their ethnicity and how does
this relate to their grievances to rebel? To what extent does ethnicity define
someones income and access to economic opportunities? The studies on eth-
nicity conflict are not discussed fully here, as the Nepalese Civil War has been
argued to be more of an ideology-based conflict. However considerations for
ethnicity on civil conflict will be included in the estimation strategy as factors
due to the abundant literature surrounding this topic.
Building off of this, a study of the Philippines by Arcand et al. (2010) adds
a disclaimer by suggesting there is a distinction between ideology-based wars
10
and ethnic-based wars on the responsiveness to aid. He finds that the effects
of development aid on ethnic based wars decrease violence, but on ideology
based wars increases violence. His model will be used in this paper to see if the
presence of aid will increase violence in this particular ideology based conflict,
possibly reaffirming his hypothesis.
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2.3 Fungibility of Aid
Aid is deemed fungible in the development literature if a receiving country uses
said aid on other expenditures outside of the intended project. A simple exam-
ple of fungible aid would be if aid was meant to fund a school in a country, but
the government was planning to build the school anyways and consequently
uses the aid funds on something else. Fungible is in essence a measure of ex-
ploitation and loot-ability (Feyzioglu et al. 1998, Devarajan and Swaroop 1998)
Non-fungible aid is found to decrease levels of conflict, for this aid is more
likely to be executed successfully (van Weezel 2015). These studies illustrate in
essence that the characteristics of an aid project may play a role in affecting vio-
lence. Furthermore, less fungible aid may considered more secure due to better
oversight/implementation and thus perhaps less likely to be looted (Strandow
2014).
Feyzioglu et al. (1998) looks at the fungibility of aid on government expendi-
tures and finds aid to not be fungible at the aggregate level. However she finds
that aid is fungible for concessionary loans given to the agriculture, education,
and energy sectors but not fungible in the transportation or communication sec-
tors. Similarly to Strandow (2014), she finds that the monitoring of aid to be a
key factor in determining fungibiliy. Strandow et al. (2016) argues that not only
the fungibiltiy of the sector of aid, but the concentration levels of aid in a partic-
ular area can have effects on its prize worthiness for rebel movements. He finds
that greater concentration levels of aid and less fungible aid increases military
fatalities.
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This finding differs from van Weezel (2015) who finds that non-fungible aid has
a slightly negative effect on conflict levels. He argues that as larger aid flows
increase the prize associated with capturing the state that provides rent-seeking
opportunities[it also] simultaneouslydecrease[s] conflict risk as it improves state
capacity. However, van Weezels findings show a weak relationship overall be-
tween fungibility and violence.
This framework is similar to the work of Berman et al. (2013, 2015) whom find
that size of a project can reduce violence, particularly when the strength of the
aid-receiving government’s forces is large. Related, Collier and Hoeffler (2007)
find no significant relationship of a nations aid creating an arms race externality,
therefore establishing aid has no influence on the stability of political landscape.
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2.4 Endogeneity of Aid
One of the large problems within the international development and conflict lit-
erature is that the distribution of aid is rather endogeneous and non-random.
Areas that receive aid are likely to be poor and also likely, as a consequence of
being poor, rebel. Furthermore, these communities are considered to be rather
geographically remote—as there is often a rural dimension to poverty. Endo-
geneity manifests itself again as geographically remote and isolated areas are
also key locations for rebel holdings due to lack of government oversight (Col-
lier 2001, Buhaug et al. 2009). However correlation does not equal causation,
which exemplifies the need for more robust modeling. Although development
aid has been active in Nepal for sometime (Ramakant 1973), there exists primar-
ily qualitative reports on Nepal linking aid programs and conflict or correlative
studies (Gersony 2003, Bonino and Donini 2009, Do and Lakshmi 2006).
Likewise, the muddled relationships of aid, poverty, and geography illustrate
how studies that use more country-level analyses are limited in exploring
causality. Countries have variations in the distribution of aid, geography, and
poverty, which may be lost at the aggregate level of in-between country analy-
ses (Blattman and Miguel 2010). It should be noted however that within-country
problems are not immune to other potential model specification problems.
For example, there are unanswered questions as to how the distribution of aid
may be affected under conflict areas or the timelapse between the decision of
donors to provide aid and the actual disbursement of it. Do donors and imple-
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mentation actors stop their projects and pull out when conflicts arise? Berman et
al. (2013) argues that development projects can still be successful depending on
the availability of expertise during conflict. Likewise it unknown how favorably
rebels view different types of development agencies and projects with respect to
their own political agendas. Furthermore it is unknown if rebels will decide to
ransack/attack/steal resources of one particular development project over an-
other. In Nepal, many intergovernmental agencies report they were chased out
of the Maoist controlled areas but some NGOs were able to continue to operate
(Pettigrew 2013, Holmberg 2016). It is further unknown to what extent NGOs
are funded by intergovernmental agencies and if rebel groups are aware of these
details. The implementation of aid projects and some of the backlash aid orga-
nizations faced during the Nepalese Civil War is discussed in the subsequent
sections. By the same token, there are also missing answers to whether aid allo-
cation in conflict states is due to demand side needs or omitted biases of donor
countries. By and large, it is troubling to compare nations on the influence of
aid due to the fact aid allocation is not necessarily random.
For instance, it can be argued that certain countries receive more humanitarian
aid in conflict areas due to the publicity they receive causing some conflicts,
such as the Nepalese Civil War to be dubbed as a ”forgotten conflict” (Narang
2016). Even though the internal conflict in Myanmar is considered one of the
longest civil conflicts in the world, the civil conflict in Syria is most discussed
in politics and on Google Searches (Google Trends 2016). The asymmetric me-
dia attention regarding civil wars arguably affects the pressure citizens put on
policymakers to aid certain countries. While this paper does not discuss hu-
manitarian aid given during projects, but development aid, arguably the pri-
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ority of countries to help another is nonrandom and politically motivated by
donor countries. This paper does not address how the aid allocation of Nepal
varies compared to other countries, but should be kept in mind in considering
the robustness of development aid and conflict studies. Extensions of my thesis
would be able to explore how donor characteristics may affect levels of con-
flict, especially when interacted with particular kinds of aid projects (i.e. health,
agriculture).
Furthermore, the expectation of aid by rebels in rent-seeking models are often
considered constant and unwavering in conflict analyses. These studies are de-
ficient in capturing the complex nature of military strategy and lose their trans-
ferability by eliminating the feature of time. These concessions are not trivial,
and as a result, the impact of foreign aid on the intensity of violent armed con-
flict has inconsistent findings.
Studies by Strandow (2014) uses propensity score matching to examine how aid
in the context of funding concentration and barriers to exploitation affect the
intensity of conflict in various Sub-Saharan African countries. Crost et al. (2014)
is able to isolate the causal effect of aid on violence by using a regression dis-
continuity model. He finds that insurgents will sabotage aid programs noting
that their success would win over the hearts and minds of possible recruits. Col-
lier and Hoeffler (2002) echo the complex nature of aid on conflict for they find
aid does not have a direct effect on conflict, but can indirectly affect the risk for
violence conditional on a country’s dependency on commodity exports.
Instrumenting is also used to overcome endogeneity especially in more macro
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between-country analyses. For example, Miguel et al. (2004) uses rainfall vari-
ation as an instrument variable for economic growth in various Sub-Saharan
Countries. Using this method, he finds that the impact of growth shocks on
conflict is not significantly different between wealthy and poor countries. The
findings of Nunn and Qian (2014) link food aid positively to conflict after instru-
menting with an index of the likelihood of receiving aid; however this instru-
ment has been met with considerable backlash (DCHA/CMM 2014). Similarly
to de Ree and Nillesen (2009), Nunn and Qian find that there is not a significant
relationship between aid and the probability of the onset of conflict. De Ree and
Nillesen, compared to Nunn and Qian, instrument the flow of aid by using the
level of GDP for donor countries. De Ree and Nillesens findings are distinct
from Nunn and Qian for he finds foreign aid has a significant negative effect on
the probability of ongoing civil conflicts to continue.
One way to circumvent this endogeneity problem is to use within-country anal-
yses and household survey data to create lagged parameters and fixed effects
measures. Furthermore by using within-country analyses, studies do not wash
or treat the disbursement of foreign aid in a country as equally distributed
(Blattman and Miguel 2010). This reiterates the strength of in-country data, such
as at the district-level, which will be used in this study.
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2.5 How Aid is Assigned
The assignment of development aid is often self-selected, but often times am-
biguous. Traditionally, the government of poorer countries work multilaterally
or bilaterally with richer ”donor” countries to create development projects that
can help achieve some anti-poverty goal. The process of manifestation of project
and actual execution has some type of delay. This delay is perhaps caused by
vetting requirements required by international organizations such as the World
Bank on the impacts of the project, political talks between countries, and the na-
ture of the aid project. For instance, grant-based projects and loan-based projects
may require different kinds of bureaucratic processing before inaction.
That being said,independent of the vetting process, there are valid questions as
to who actually gets selected for an aid project. I review aid development litera-
ture that is respective of the time period of study. This is to have representative
behaviors of donors and the aid selection process.
Aid is not poverty-efficiently allocated (Collier and Dollar 2002, Cogneau and
Naudet 2007). Collier and Dollar finds that aid is targeted and allocated in weak
policy environments and in countries with severe poverty problems. Policy and
the rule of law appear to be important considerations for donors and the effec-
tiveness of aid (Dollar and Levin 2006, Djankov et al. 2009, Dreher et al. 2009,
Younas 2008). This therefore may make the effect of aid heterogeneous depend-
ing on the type of product and who is the sponsoring donor. Furthermore aid
selection can be determined by trade partners (Younas 2008, Berthelemy 2002),
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colonial ties (Alesina and Dollar 2000) or the intent of a donor country to de-
mocratize the recipient country (Bermeo 2011).
As a result of the perhaps non-random allocation of aid in Nepal for the time
period in question, I use further two stage least square methods to reiterate the
strength of my results.
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2.6 Causes of the Nepalese Civil War
To understand the causes of the intensity of violence or the spread of insurgency
during the Nepalese Civil War, scholars typically use a discrete choice model or
a Poisson maximum likelihood model. Scholars also differ their response vari-
able by either measuring the intensity of conflict, via number of fatalities, or de-
gree of Maoist influence respectively. The distinguishing factors in the design
of these papers are the construction of the minimum thresholds for significant
intensity of conflict and the sample selection of specific Administrative zones.
The country of Nepal has however changed its definition of administrative ar-
eas. Since September 20, 2015, the country is now divided into 7 provinces
by grouping together the various 75 districts. Previously, the country had five
development regions which were divided into 14 administrative zones (which
were unions of the 75 districts). I adopt the latter specification in my analysis.
Keeping this in mind, Blattman and Miguel (2010) argue that civil war studies
provide superficial explanations and lack in providing the underlying mecha-
nism that truly causes conflict. For instance inequality does not automatically
translate to a creation or tangible cause of conflict. For example, ethnicity or
racial identity does not create wage disparities in economic labor literature but
rather how the labor market perceives race. Thus it can be argued that the actual
cause of war is unobserved and left in the ”error term” (Gartzke 1999).
Murshed and Gates (2005) link the intensity of conflict in Nepal through the
grieve and grievance framework of Collier and others. Their analysis finds that
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the intensity of conflict (measured in fatalities) is significantly linked to areas
that are disadvantaged in terms of human development indicators and land
holdings or ”grievance”. They along with Brown et al. (2010) cite horizontal
inequality (i.e. unequal access to economic opportunities, asset inequality, etc.)
as the main factor driving conflict and suggest that aid can lower the onset of
violence by upholding the social contract (Addison and Murshed 2001). Because
of the lack of natural resources in Nepal, they believe the ”greed” framework
may not accurately capture the phenomena of the civil war. Not examining
Nepal specifically, Hegre et. al (2001) find that intermediate regimes, like the
one experienced by Nepal before the civil war, are most prone to violence.
Similarly, a study by Do and Lakshmi (2006) echoes these findings that areas
with greater poverty and lower levels of economic development, signaled by
road density, have a significant positive affect on the spread of violence conflict.
Do additionally finds that the lack of economic opportunities is a stronger expla-
nation for the spread of violence than social diversity. Moreover he explains that
if ever, social polarization (i.e. caste system in Nepal) would cause conflict by
affecting economic opportunities but it is not itself a causal factor. For example,
lower literacy rates are more significantly and robustly related to higher inten-
sity of conflict than a district’s caste composition. Unlike previous studies, Do
further contributes to the literature in examining the influence of time, where he
finds that overtime as Maoist rebels advance their control, considerably better
off areas are more exposed to violence.
Hatlebakk (2009) disputes findings by Murshed and Gates by transforming
their continuous parameter of casualties to a discrete variable indicating Maoist-
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influenced districts. He finds through this dichotomous analysis that landless-
ness is negatively correlated with Maoist influence and is not a significant factor
in affecting conflict after removing two core Maoist districts which he deems as
outliers.
Bohara et al. (2006) finds that the exchange of violence can be explained through
the influence of political opportunities (i.e. social and democracy) and that
of natural geography (geographic opportunities). Similarly Holtermann (2016)
finds that geography is a key influence on the spread of rebellion. More specifi-
cally, Joshi and Mason (2010) find land tenure patterns coupled with elite control
to be key factors on the levels of political violence.
Holtermann (2016) and Macours (2011) disagree over the robustness of previous
findings of Do and Murshed by viewing the spread of violence through rela-
tively defined parameters rather than over time. For instance Holtermann finds
human development indicators to be statistically insignificant, once the spread
of violence is viewed in terms of government versus rebel capacity rather than
time. Holtermann does not believe pre-existing conditions such as inequality
and poverty can be cited as the mechanism in creating conflict as the capacity of
rebels affects their strategy for insurgency.
Macours finds that it is not inequality that affected the abduction strategy of
rebels to recruit rebels and their spread of influence, but the relative increases
of land inequality between different socio-economic groups. Macours points
out that in Nepal the poverty rate declined during the war years even though
inequality increased. This therefore poses another caveat to understand how de-
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velopment aid influences conflict and to what extent aid manifests itself through
a decline in poverty. Different from the findings above, Silwal (2013) finds once
controlling for time and the proximity of areas to violence, Nepalese socioeco-
nomic conditions such as poverty or related to geography are statistically in-
significant in explaining the spread and intensity of violence.
Shortfalls of these previously cited studies is that although they cite economic
inequality as a role in affecting the conflict, they do not demonstrate whether
public policy such as development aid played a role in deterring or encouraging
conflict. Development aid can influence not only poverty but also the inequality
composition of a society. It should be noted that reports and qualitative studies
make a connection that aid may have affected conflict in Nepal, but argue this
based on aid being an example of ”failed development” (Bonino and Donini
2009, Gersony 2003). This does not literally mean that aid increases the likeli-
hood of conflict, but rather claims if coupled with ineffective implementation,
aid can. However these qualitative reports often argue that because aid was
ineffective before the war, it caused people to rebel, which is a rather shallow
explanation.
Equally important, few studies use the destruction of public works, national
trust, or human capital effects (De Juan and Pierskalla 2016, Pivovaraova and
Swee 2015) as a measure of conflict intensity besides human fatalities. Further-
more most human fatalities as conflict intensity studies do not distinguish be-
tween military and civilian fatalities. This is often due to data limitations, but
does pose possible consequences. By focusing on only human fatalities, studies
are limited in understanding conflict by only measuring correlations between
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economic factors such as poverty on income inequality on human life. This
poses a problem, for instance, the probability of one rebel soldier dying may
not be equal to that of a government soldier. The weights of the capacity of
individuals to kill are perplexing to model. Likewise the conclusions of these
studies create problems in defining the value of human life in cost-benefit anal-
yses to justify economic development. Would a hypothetical reduction in 2.5
human lives be worth an addition $100 of economic development aid? The an-
swer to this is not trivial and illustrates the frustrating conclusions of economics
of conflict literature. Likewise, are policymakers more concerned with how aid
affects civilian causalities than rebel-related causalities? These considerations
are often not aware in conflict economic analyses.
My study remedies these shortfalls by introducing more accurate measures of
foreign aid influences by linking household survey data and aid projects more
effectively. By introducing measures of civilian and military fatalities, my study
allows to see how aid can influence different populations during conflict.
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CHAPTER 3
HYPOTHESES
I formulate the following hypotheses for my study based on my research ques-
tions:
1. To what extent did the presence of development aid projects suppress or
encourage violence during the Nepalese Civil War (2000-2006)?
Hypothesis 1: Aggregated aid projects have a positive effect on conflict
violence.
2. To what extent did different types of aid-sector-based development
projects suppress or encourage violence during the Nepalese Civil War
(2000-2006)?
Hypothesis 2: Different aid-sector-based projects have the same effect
on conflict violence.
3. To what extent did different levels of aid concentration suppress or en-
courage violence during the Nepalese Civil War (2000-2006)?
Hypothesis 3: Different levels of aid concentration have the same effect
on conflict violence.
The motivation for Hypothesis 1 originates from the literature where aid is ei-
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ther found as a motivator or deterrent for violence.1 This depends if aid is seen:
1) as a rent which increases violence due to increasing the value of the ”prize”
gained from victory or 2) a mechanism that increases the status of living for citi-
zens and thus increasing opportunity cost to rebel. Hypothesis 2 and 3 are more
narrow examinations of the more aggregated view of development aid in Hy-
pothesis 1. However, Hypothesis 1, 2, and 3 are independent from one another,
the findings of one does not imply findings for others.
1Arcand (2010) finds a positive relationship between aid levels and conflict in ideology-based
conflicts, which would be an appropriate categorization for the Maoist Nepalese Civil War.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
4.1 Datasets
Below I discuss the sources of my Conflict Data, Development Aid Data, and
Socio-Economic Data.
4.1.1 Conflict Data
The conflict data for this study comes from the Uppsala Conflict Dataset from
Upsala University, which has an extensive list of modern-day conflict events
since 1989. I specifically use the ”UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset version
5.0. (2015)”1 The dataset is rich for it provides information on conflict events,
the best estimate of fatalities, a geo-referenced location of the event, and even
lists the sources where the event was mentioned. Other characteristics such
as which parties were involved or how long the event lasted for are included
as well. As a result, this dataset has been a major contribution to the conflict
economics literature and boasts over 100 publications.2
Using this dataset, I choose Nepalese conflict events during the 2000-2006 time
period for this study. I construct a time series panel of selected variables and
1The dataset can be accessed here: http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/
2See http:///www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/publcations/ for the entire list.
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index them by 84 month time periods and the 75 districts of Nepal. Due to
representative constraints in my development aid and socio-economic data, to
be discussed below, I end up only focusing on 69 districts.
The variables that originate from the Uppsala Conflict Dataset that are used
in my primary analysis are the following: the total number of conflict events,
the best estimate of total fatalities, the total number of civilian fatalities, and
the total number of military fatalities. I use the term ”fatalities” and ”deaths”
interchangeably in this paper. For further robustness testing found in Section
7.6.2. of my study, I create these same parameters, but condition them on being
the result of a rebel-initiated conflict event.
Because of the lack of precision in the geocoding of the Uppsala Dataset, I am
unable to find rich data at the ward level. As a result, I must collapse my data
to the district level which is the justification for my development aid and socio-
economic data to be also indexed at the district level.
4.1.2 Development Aid Data
The development aid data for this study comes from the College of William
and Mary’s AidData Group. I specifically consult their ”Nepal AIMS, Level 1,
Version 1.4.1”3 dataset which represents all projects in the Nepal’s Aid Manage-
ment Platform, established in 2010, which is maintained by Nepal’s Ministry
3This dataset can be accessed here: http://aiddata.org/subnational-geospatial-research-
datasets
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of Finance. The dataset includes 873 projects implemented in 20,952 locations
by 110 donors for years 1997-2014. I select aid data for years 2000-2006 that is
geocoded to at least the district level. I construct a time series panel dataset that
is indexed at the district and month level for the following variables: the aggre-
gated number of active development projects, the types of active development
projects, and the aid money spent on said projects in a district. I assume here
that the money designated for an aid project is equally disbursed during each
month the project is active.
There are 25 unique projects in my study that are enacted in over roughly 3,500
unique locations during my time frame of study. For the purposes of this study,
and specifically evaluating Hypothesis 1, I use the 3,500 unique locations to be
the total number of aggregated aid projects.
The dataset also includes a coding for the sector at which the project was meant
to impact. Some projects are multi-pronged and have combined initiatives such
as ”health” and ”education.” These assignments are given in the dataset which
have been categorized by the Nepalese Ministry of Finance. For testing Hy-
pothesis 2, I make the same time series panel dataset but add an extra index for
sector.4
One of the shortfalls of the data, as described in its read-me manual is that there
are few projects recorded for the beginning years of my study. This is perhaps
due to the fact the central record keeping of aid projects was not formalized until
4If a project is dubbed to be both ”education” and ”health,” I do not consider it belonging to a
specific sector and therefore it would not be indexed. I only examine single-sectored designated
projects for testing Hypothesis 2.
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2010. Seen Figure 4.1, it should be noted that my development aid observations
are more weighted in later month time periods. This limitation of the data is
a reason for why I do not study the entire range of the conflict.5 However, by
using random effects and other time specific effects in my study, I believe I can
overcome this shortfall.
Figure 4.1: AidData Start Count by Year for Nepal
Additionally, I omit three districts from my analysis for there are no active de-
velopment projects during the time period of study. I am uncertain if the omis-
sion is due to a sincere lack of projects or measurement error.
5Furthermore, studying the entire conflict period may provide different implications on how
aid affects the onset versus continuation of violence.
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4.1.3 Socio-Economic Data
The socio-economic data for this study are provided by three sources. The first
is Panel 1 of the National Living Standards Survey, conducted in 1996. The
NLSS survey is only representative of 72 of the 75 districts, which modifies my
analysis further when considering aid data sampling to 69 districts. The NLSS
survey is conducted at the ward-level but is collapsed to the district level using
sampling weights.
The two other datasets are from digitizing texts I consulted at the Library
of Congress. Firstly, the 2004 United Nations Development Report of Nepal
(UNDP 2004) provides other district-level socio-economic information from
2001. The United Nations Human Development Report for Nepal has been pre-
pared since 1998, with the 2004 version focusing on citizen empowerment and
social and economic outcomes.
Secondly, the Districts of Nepal Indicators of Development 2003 (DNID) pro-
vides information on local municipality budgets. The district level indicators
were commissioned by the National Planning Commission Secretariat using
Central Bureau of Statistics data.
For my analysis I use 21 socio-economic district-level variables such as the GDP
of a district, the percentage of female-headed households, the percentage of
households employed by agriculture, and the district share of the total devel-
opment in budget expenditures (in millions of Nepalese Rupees). A list of these
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particular variables and their corresponding data source are provided in Section
11, Appendix 2.
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4.2 Summary Statistics
Below I present summary statistics for my conflict data, my development aid
data, and my socio-economic data.
4.2.1 Conflict Data
The Upppsala Dataset for this time period reports 3,954 conflict events which
are decomposed by year in Figure 4.2 at the district level. The most conflict
events occurred during years 2002 and 2004, which also happened after cease-
fires experienced in 2003 and 2005. The least amount of conflict events occurred
during 2000 and 2006. As confirmed by Table 4.1, on average a district experi-
enced 18 total conflict events in 2002 and 14 total conflict events in 2004. This is
in contrast to roughly 2.3 total conflict events in 2000 and 2006.
This yearly pattern is also found in Figure 4.3 which decomposes the 9,252 Up-
psala Dataset reported conflict deaths by year at the district level. For as we see,
2002 and 2004 had the deadliest years. As described in Table 4.2, districts had
on average a total of 53 deaths in 2000 and on average a total of 29 deaths in
2004. Similarly, 2000 and 2006 had on average the least total number of conflict
deaths of 4 and 6 deaths respectively.
Within the recorded 9,252 deaths, in the Uppsala Dataset, are 1,704 civilian
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deaths and 1,316 military deaths. The decomposition of total civilian deaths
by year at the district level is found in Figure 4.4. As seen in Table 4.3 when
comparing the mean and median of civilian deaths, it appears that fewer dis-
tricts experience civilian deaths but the ones who do, experience it at very large
quantities. This is reconfirmed in Figure 4.4 with the spread of outliers espe-
cially in year 2002.
The 1,316 military deaths from the Uppsala Dataset are decomposed by year at
the district level in Figure 4.5. However, it should be noted, unlike the high lev-
els of overall deaths and events in 2002, the Uppsala dataset reports no military
deaths in 2002. Furthermore, 2005 which experienced a ceasefire has the largest
average total number of military deaths at the district level, as seen in Table 4.4.
Table 4.5 presents the correlations between the annual levels of conflict (deaths,
events, civilian deaths, and military deaths) and the 2001 population. There
does not appear to be a high correlation between population and the annual lev-
els of conflict. There are larger correlations between conflict deaths and conflict
events, but this is due to the fact a conflict death must occur during a conflict
event. There is a higher correlation, or probability of a civilian death occurring
than a military death occurring during a given conflict event.
34
Figure 4.2: Total Number of Conflict Events by Year
This boxplot is grouped at the district level and decomposed by year where each dot represents
the total conflict events for a given district. Additionally, the horizontal line within the box
indicates the median. Further, the boundaries of the box indicate the 25th and the 75th percentile
and the whiskers indicate the highest and lowest values of the results. The dots outside of the
box represent outliers.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Conflict Events by Year
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median
2000 69 2.275 5.512 0 29 0
2001 69 2.812 3.512 0 19 2
2002 69 17.957 15.492 0 64 15
2003 69 9.928 8.277 0 45 9
2004 69 15.014 12.978 0 55 13
2005 69 7 5.973 0 21 6
2006 69 2.319 2.923 0 14 1
These summary statistics describe the total number of conflict events at the district level.
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Figure 4.3: Total Number of Conflict Deaths by Year
This boxplot is grouped at the district level and decomposed by year where each dot represents
the total conflict deaths (the sum of civilian, rebel, and military forces) for a given district. Addi-
tionally, the horizontal line within the box indicates the median. Further, the boundaries of the
box indicate the 25th and the 75th percentile and the whiskers indicate the highest and lowest
values of the results. The dots outside of the box represent outliers.
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics of Conflict Deaths by Year
Variable Year Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median
2000 69 4.145 10.529 0 59 0
2001 69 7.043 11.85 0 58 2
2002 69 53.174 78.263 0 480 30
2003 69 19.348 18.246 0 90 15
2004 69 28.536 33.646 0 209 22
2005 69 15.971 21.251 0 108 9
2006 69 5.87 10.264 0 53 1
These summary statistics describe the total number of conflict deaths at the district level.
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Figure 4.4: Total Number of Civilian Deaths by Year
This boxplot is grouped at the district level and decomposed by year where each dot represents
the total civilian deaths for a given district. Additionally, the horizontal line within the box
indicates the median. Further, the boundaries of the box indicate the 25th and the 75th percentile
and the whiskers indicate the highest and lowest values of the results. The dots outside of the
box represent outliers.
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of Civilian Deaths by Year
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median
2000 69 1.275 3.682 0 26 0
2001 69 1.551 2.159 0 9 1
2002 69 5.884 9.568 0 65 3
2003 69 4.536 5.011 0 28 3
2004 69 6.478 7.091 0 32 4
2005 69 3.58 4.483 0 21 2
2006 69 1.391 2.481 0 11 0
These summary statistics describe the total number of civilian deaths at the district level.
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Figure 4.5: Total Number of Military Deaths by Year
This boxplot is grouped at the district level and decomposed by year where each dot represents
the total military deaths for a given district. Additionally, the horizontal line within the box
indicates the median. Further, the boundaries of the box indicate the 25th and the 75th percentile
and the whiskers indicate the highest and lowest values of the results. The dots outside of the
box represent outliers.
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics of Military Deaths by Year
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max P50
2000 69 1.551 3.587 0 16 0
2001 69 3.638 7.772 0 34 0
2002 69 0 0 0 0 0
2003 69 3.174 4.004 0 19 2
2004 69 4.884 8.593 0 36 2
2005 69 4.029 9.777 0 71 1
2006 69 1.797 4.51 0 20 0
These summary statistics describe the total number of military at the district level.
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Table 4.5: Correlation Table of District Conflict Data
Variables 2001 Population Conflict Conflict Civilian Military
Deaths Events Deaths Deaths
2001 Population 1.000
Conflict Deaths -0.008 1.000
Conflict Events 0.089 0.490 1.000
Civilian Deaths 0.069 0.321 0.457 1.000
Military Deaths 0.008 0.425 0.224 0.100 1.000
These correlations are made comparing total conflict levels during the time period of study and
2001 population data collapsed at the district level.
4.2.2 Development Aid Data
There are 25 development projects worth over $1.9 billion with over 35,000 lo-
cations active in the time period of my study. Here, I associate the number of
”projects” to be the number of unique locations a project is enacted. Within the
25 development projects, there is 1 education-sector based project with 315 lo-
cations, 2 health-sector based projects with 78 locations, 4 water-sector based
projects with 1179 locations, 5 energy-sector based projects with 162 locations, 2
agriculture-sector based projects with 49 locations, and 2 general budget-sector
based projects with 2,104 locations.
4.2.3 Socio-Economic Data
Here I discuss some of the socio-economic data used in my analysis. The av-
erage log district GDP (in millions of Nepalese Rupees) from the UNDP 2004
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dataset, is 8.233 with a minimum of 5.835 and a max of 10.785 as presented in
Table 4.6. The four variables included in Table 4.6 are all right-skewed due to
the district of Katmandu where the capital is located. Katmandu is the major
outlier for all of these socioeconomic variables.
Table 4.6: Summary Statistics of GDP of District
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max P50
Log District GDP 5796 8.233 .836 5.835 10.785 8.273
(in millions of
Nepalese Rupees )
Per Capita Income 5796 .018 .018 .009 .157 .015
(in millions of
Nepalese Rupees)
Log District Development 5796 19.149 .939 15.976 23.607 19.034
Budget expenditure in
Nepalese Rupees
Gini 5796 .562 .234 0 1 .551
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CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
I consider the general framework strategy below for my study, whereby I seek
to understand the effect of development aid on conflict violence. To understand
this relationship, I use the micro-level district data from the Nepalese Civil War,
as discussed in Section 4.
As mentioned previously, if development aid affects conflict violence positively,
it can be concluded that development aid is seen as a rent therefore increasing
the incentive for violence and the ”pot” of gains from victory. If development
aid affects conflict violence negatively, aid can be concluded as a deterrent for
violent by successfully increasing the opportunity cost of engaging in fighting
and thus discouraging violence.
Although aid is not randomly assigned, I prove it to be exogenous below, after
defining my general estimation strategy. By proving this exogeneity of aid in
Section 5.1 and 5.2, I can assume causality of aid on violence. I also do further
endogeneity testing using 2SLS models later in Section 8.
For a given district, I view conflict violence here to be a function of development
aid and socio-economic characteristics:
conflict violence = f(development aid, socio-economic characteristics)
The relationship above also includes a district-specific random effect, an unob-
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served municipality-specific effect, and an unobserved time-specific shock that
affects all districts equally.
For my identification strategy, I choose conflict violence to be represented by
four different parameters: conflict events, conflict deaths1, military deaths, and
civilian deaths. Due to the count nature of these dependent variables, and like
many models in the conflict economics literature2, I adopt a poisson with ran-
dom effects model for all my regressions.3
I test the strength of my preliminary findings by using a zero-inflated nega-
tive binomial models in Section 8. I do this in order to confront possible bias
of my preliminary finding estimations due to characteristics of my dependent
variables.
Below I first try to prove the assignment of aid as random or exogeneous in or-
der to solidify my claims of exogeneity of aid in Section 5.1 and 5.2. I first do this
by regression project levels on socio-economic variables as found in this study.
I further propose a 2SLS specification further explored in Section 8. There, I
identify unbalanced socio-economic variables as a FSLS specification and use
predicted values in my 2SLS specification. I use a zero-inflated negative bino-
mial model in my 2SLS specification and compare these results with those found
in Section 7.
1It should be noted conflict deaths is a sum of military, civilian, and rebel fatalities
2Arcand (2010), Crost (2014), Macours (2011), Dasgupta (2016)
3Arcand (2010) uses a tobit model with death data, but omits his reasoning. Therefore, I do
not find any statistical reason to not use it over a poisson with random effects model, and thus
adopt this approach.
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The three hypotheses vary in their identification of the development aid param-
eter, T . Their respective models are presented below in Section 5.2-5.4.
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5.1 Proving Development as Random
5.1.1 Socio-Economic Characteristics on Aid Assignments
Test 1
One of the issues that can arise from looking at the relationship between devel-
opment aid and conflict is the non-random assignment of aid projects. Whereby
countries, or even localities, are inherently more likely to receive aid. Further-
more, other latent variables are not observed in the aid distribution process. For
instance, it is possible that donors may be more willing to distribute aid in areas
which are least prone to violence.
Here, I test to see if the assignment of aid is random by performing two re-
gressions with different forms of my aggregated aid parameters (the treatment
dummy for having at least one project and aid funds). Firstly, I regress the pa-
rameters on district socioeconomic variables found in Appendix 2 used for my
study. Secondly, I regress the parameters on district socioeconomic variables
found in Appendix 2 used for my study with zone dummies. Thirdly, I regress
the parameters on district socioeconomic variables found in Appendix 2 used
for my study with district dummies. The general regressions are found framed
below:
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1. aggregated aid parameters (present? Y=1, N=0; aid funds) = f(socio-
economic characteristics)
2. aggregated aid parameters (present? Y=1, N=0; aid funds) = f(socio-
economic characteristics, zone dummies)
3. aggregated aid parameters (present? Y=1, N=0; aid funds) = f(socio-
economic characteristics, district dummies)
The first and second estimation find a significant relationship between socio-
economic covariates and receiving at least one aid project or the amount of aid
funds received. However, when including district dummies, all of the socio-
economic covariates are all insignificant, therefore illustrating that when district
fixed effects are considered, the assignment of aid can be considered random.
For hypothesis 2, I explore projects targeting a specific sector. I also do the fol-
lowing exercise from above. The relationship between different aid-sector based
projects (i.e. education, health) have parallel findings to those found above.
Therefore, by doing so, the dependent variables are insignificant, and the as-
signment of aid can be considered randomly assigned. This is because develop-
ment aid is uncorrelated with the socio-economic characteristics with the inclu-
sion of district dummies. Therefore following test 1, the treatment of develop-
ment aid is orthogonal on observables and thus aid can be considered randomly
assigned.
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Test 2
Additionally for a post regression robustness check discussed to a larger extent
in Section 8, I collapse my data to the district level and compare the socioeco-
nomic means of districts which received aid and those who did not by running
t-tests. I find depending if I examine the aggregated level of aid, different sec-
tors of aid, concentrations of aid, where certain socioeconomic variables are not
balanced. For instance, areas with lower levels of secondary education are sta-
tistically more likely to receive education aid projects compared to those who
higher levels of education. A breakdown of socioeconomic variables that are
not balanced in the assignment of aid is found in Table 11.1 in Appendix 2.
I use socioeconomic variables which have a p value less than .2 to be included
in my first stage regression. For my first stage, the type of model used varies on
the corresponding dependent variable. Since I measure aid presence by either
a treatment (education project? yes or no, did they receive any aid? yes or no;
Y=1, N=0), the number of projects, or the total number of funds, I cannot use
the first stage as a poisson model. For the treatment variable, I use a logistic
model with random effects in the first stage. For the total number of projects
I use a poisson random effects model. For the total number of funds I use a
linear random effects model, appropriate for monetary-based dependent vari-
ables. Lastly, for concentration based variables such as being classified as high
or low concentration I use a logistic model with randome effects as well. The
general model for the first stage least squares regressions are listed below:
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First Stage Least Squares Regressions
1. Aid Present? (Y=1, N=0) = f(unbalanced socio-economic variables)
Logistic Regression with Random Effects
2. Number of Projects Present? f(unbalanced socio-economic variables)
Poisson Regression with Random Effects
3. Logistic Aid Funds = f(unbalanced socio-economic variables)
Linear Random Effects
I then compare the coefficients of the 2SLS regression after my robustness checks
of using a zero-inflated negative binomial model from Section 7 with these find-
ings in Section 8. I compare the results for each hypothesis and reaffirm of nul-
lify previous findings as causal.
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5.2 Model for Hypothesis 1
To test hypothesis 1,
Hypothesis 1: Aggregated aid projects have a positive effect on conflict vio-
lence.
I choose the following empirical strategy:
E[Yit|Tit, Xi, . . .] = exp{Titα +∑nf=1 Xiβ f + ui + δt + i + ηit}
• Yit: Conflict Violence as measured by conflict events, conflict deaths, mil-
itary deaths, or civilian deaths
• Tit: Aggregated Aid Projects as measured by general project presence (a
dummy variable), the total number of projects active, logged total aid
project funds disbursed
• X¯i: Socio Economic Characteristics See Appendix 2 for a complete list of
these.
• ui: District-specific Random Effect
• δt: Unobserved Time-Specifc Shock which can be assumed to affect all
districts equally
• i: Unobserved municipality-specific effect
• ηit: Idiosyncratic Disturbance Term
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I use the four different dependent variable parameters as introduced before,
conflict events, conflict deaths, military deaths, and civilian deaths, to be repre-
sented as Yit whereby conflict violence is presented for each district i in month
time period t.
I formulate three different independent variables as different measures of ag-
gregated (or ”pooled”) aid project presence, Tit. I use one identification of said
presence using the general dummy treatment found in Arcand et. al (2010) but
modify two other development aid presence indicators.4 The general dummy
treatment which is I dub as ”general project presence” is equal to 1 if there is
at least one development project active in a district i in month time period t.5
The second form of aid project presence is the total number of projects active in
district i in month time period t. The third and last form of aid project presence
I consider is the logged total aid project funds distributed in a district i in month
time period t. This is not the aggregated total of funds since 2000, but the total
number of funds that are disbursed in that particular month time period i. For
this variable, I assume that there is an equal distribution of funds for a project.6
Together, I choose to estimate, only eight regressions to test this hypothesis
rather than 12 exhaustive7 regressions. I estimate three poisson with random
effects models for each of the three independent variables Tit of aggregated aid
4This is due to the fact I am pooling all development aid projects rather than simply one
project found in Arcand et. al (2010). Arcand uses the number of months a project is active and
the accumulation of funds to an areas from one particular project. Since I am considering all
projects for hypothesis 1 his variables are not appropriate without modification.
5Here district refers to one of the 75 districts in Nepal and month time period refers to a
particular month in the range of January 2000-November 2006.
6Consider a hypothetical project active in a district for a year with a budget of $60 million
USD, I assume each month the district receives $5 million USD
7Exhaustive if considering combinations of the four dependent variables with the three in-
dependent variables
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projects on conflict events. I then conduct three poisson with random effects
models incorporating all independent variables of aggregated aid projects on
conflict deaths. Lastly, I execute two poisson with random effects models exam-
ining general aid project presence dummy on military deaths and civilian deaths.
To Do: Chart of the eight regressions
My estimation strategy, besides the modification of the two independent vari-
ables and the consideration of civilian and military deaths, is a replication of the
estimation strategy in Arcand et al. (2010). In order for the model to correctly
identify the effect of development aid on conflict, the following assumptions
have to be considered.
Besides having accurate data, the variables assume that there is little variation
in district socio-economic characteristics overtime, as they are exogenously ob-
served. I also assume that aid is exogeneously distributed to districts which I
confront in Section 8’s 2SLS estimations. Furthermore, I assume that there is
little variation in the quality of aid projects in terms of their execution, quality,
security, etc. For example, donors have relatively the same set of best practices
they use in executing aid projects.
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5.3 Model for Hypothesis 2
To test hypothesis 2,
Hypothesis 2: Different aid-sector-based projects have the same effect on con-
flict violence
I choose the following empirical strategy. Here, I modify the meaning of the
Tit parameter from the Empirical Strategy for Hypothesis 1 and introduce a k
subscript for a corresponding aid-sector, Titk. All other variables have the same
meaning as defined in the Empirical Strategy for Hypothesis 1.
E[Yit|Titk, Xi, . . .] = exp{∑6k=1 Titkαk +∑nf=1 Xiβ f + ui + δt + i + ηit}
• Titk: Sector-Based Aid Projects as measured by sector project presence (a
dummy variable), total number of sector projects active, logged total aid
sector project funds disbursed
I create now k versions of the three independent variables used in the empirical
strategy of hypothesis 1 for Tit. I transform the project presence, the number of
projects active, and the logged total aid project funds parameters to become in-
dexed at the k level, Titk. The k index coordinates to the six aid sectors I consider
analyzing: education, agriculture, health, water and sanitation, general budget,
and energy. I use the classification provided by the AidData dataset in assigning
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the categories to aid sectors. I choose these six sectors out of the 17 sector labels
included in the dataset.
To illustrate Titk further, I create an education dummy treatment which is equal
to 1 if there is at least one education project active in district i in month time pe-
riod t in which k = education sector. Analogously the second form of education
aid project presence is the total number of projects active in district i in month
time period t in the k = education sector. Lastly, I consider the logged total edu-
cation aid project funds distributed in a district i in month time period t in the
k = education sector. I repeat this for the other five remaining sectors.
Here, I estimate again only eight regressions to test this hypothesis rather than
the 12 exhaustive regressions. Again, for all estimations I use a poisson with
random effects models approach. I conduct three regressions, incorporating the
three versions of Titk, on conflict events. Analogously, I do the same but change
conflict events for conflict deaths. Lastly, I estimate two regressions using only
the sector dummies of Titk on civilian deaths and the other on military deaths.
My estimation strategy differs as described in my hypothesis 1 approach from
Arcand. However, here I consider findings of Strandow (2014),8 which investi-
gates how sectors affect military and civilian deaths.
Here I must make the assumption that projects grouped in a particular sector are
executed similarly. Moreover, it must be assumed that there is more variation
between aid-sector based projects than within aid-sector based projects. This
8Strandow considers fungibility of sectors specifically and does not identify the sectors as I
have.
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variation includes the quality of execution of the project, the type of oversight
and security of said projects, or even the composition of capital versus labor
resources of said projects.
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5.4 Model for Hypothesis 3
To test hypothesis 3,
Hypothesis 3: Different levels of aid concentration have the same effect on
conflict violence
I choose the following empirical strategy. Here, I again modify the meaning of
the Tit parameter from the Empirical Strategy for Hypothesis 1 and introduce a c
subscript for a corresponding level of aid concentration, Titc. All other variables
have the same meaning as defined in the Empirical Strategy for Hypothesis 1.
E[Yit|Titc, Xi, . . .] = exp{∑7c=1 Titcαc +∑nf=1 Xiβ f + ui + δt + i + ηit}
• Titc: Aid Concentration Levels as measured by development aid divided
by population, dummies for the top 25% percentile, the bottom 25% per-
centile, or one of five quartiles of aid (base being where there are no aid
projects active)
To identify concentration Titc, I divide the project money allocated for aid
projects by the population of a district in a district i that are active in month
time period t. Depending on the measure of Titc I am using, I create different
dummy indicators for indicating high or low concentration and create quantiles
of aid concentration levels. Aid concentration can be regarded as the relative
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aid spending per capita of a district compared to the aid spending per capita of
other districts.
Omitting districts with no active projects in the measurement, high concen-
tration refers to the top 25% and low concentration refers to the bottom 25%
percentiles of aid concentration. I also create quantiles of concentration levels,
again omitting districts with no active projects in the assignment of quantiles.
Here I must assume that the data I have on aid projects is well-represented of all
active projects. If not, then I clearly have a misspecification, as I assign concen-
tration levels based on the number of active projects per capita relative to other
districts.
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CHAPTER 6
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
The preliminary findings for each empirical strategy outlined in Section 5 is
discussed below. A summary of the preliminary findings is presented in Table
6.1.
Table 6.1: Summary of Preliminary Findings for Hypotheses
Hypothesis Preliminary Finding
Hypothesis 1: Aggregated aid projects have a positive effect Rejected
on conflict violence
Hypothesis 2: Different aid-sector-based projects have the same Rejected
effect on violence
Hypothesis 3: Different levels of aid concentration have the same Rejected
effect on conflict violence
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6.1 Hypothesis 1
Using the estimation strategy for testing Hypothesis 1 from Section 5.2, I discuss
my preliminary findings.
As seen in Tables 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3, preliminary findings for Hypothesis 1 in-
dicate predominately supporting, but a few contradicting results. Considering
these conflicting preliminary findings, Hypothesis 1 is rejected.
Supporting Hypothesis 1, for a given month, if at least one development project
is active in a district, the number of conflict events significantly increase by
145%1 (Table 10.1). Similarly, having at least one aid project active significantly
increases the number of conflict death and civilian deaths (Table 10.2 and 10.3).
Although insignificant, military deaths respond positively to having at least one
aid project active as well. Furthermore, increasing budgets of aid projects sig-
nificantly increases the number of conflict events and conflict deaths
However, the magnitude of projects can have implications on violence. Find-
ings indicate that increases in the number of projects significantly reduce the
occurrence of conflict events and the number of conflict deaths.
Therefore, some preliminary findings do support hypothesis 1, that develop-
ment aid is a rent provoking more conflict and violence. A reason for why there
are diverging results between my independent variables could be due to the fact
1A point estimate of .375 corresponds to exp(.375) = 1.45.
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that the number of projects is not as appealing to rebels’ movement or engage-
ment in violence as compared to the actual monetary value of the aid projects
in a district.
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6.2 Hypothesis 2
Using the estimation strategy for testing Hypothesis 2 from Section 5.3, I discuss
my preliminary findings.
As seen in Tables 10.4, 10.5, and 10.6, preliminary findings reject Hypothesis 2,
for different aid sectors have different effects on conflict violence.
Having at least one agriculture or health project active in a district significantly
reduces the occurrence of conflict events by more than 70% (Table 10.4). Con-
trasting, having one energy project significantly increases the chance of conflict
events. More aid projects and more money spent on agricultural, health, or gen-
eral budget sectors is a significantly effective tool in reducing conflict events
from occurring. While increasing the number of education and energy projects
have insignificant effects on violence.
As a result, different sector-based projects may be perceived as rents or even,
certain sector-based projects are more effective in increasing the opportunity
cost for violence than others.
Similar patterns rejecting hypothesis 2 are found if we are to examine the im-
pact of various aid sector projects on conflict, military, and civilian deaths (Table
10.5 and 10.6). Different aid sectors affect conflict fatalities differently. Here, the
presence of at least one agricultural, water, health, or general budget signifi-
cantly reduce the number of conflict, military, and civilian deaths. While, the
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presence of at least one educational and energy project significantly increase the
number of conflict, military, and civilian deaths.
Besides rejecting hypothesis 2, these preliminary findings indicate that certain
aid sectors may be better at deterring violence than others. As a result, invest-
ing in agricultural, water, health, or general budget projects may increase the
livelihoods of poorer individuals better and thus increase the opportunity cost
for violence. Energy or education projects may not be as effective in increasing
the opportunity cost and may be perceived as an attractive rent to be gained
from violence.
Another explanation would be considering that education, energy, and agricul-
tural projects are more fungible in nature.2 This would mean that these educa-
tion and energy projects are more likely not to have been executed effectively;
their project funds may be diverted for other government initiatives. As a re-
sult, these projects are unable to increase the opportunity cost of violence due to
poor oversight and government execution, rather than some inherent badness
of improving education or energy resources.
2Although fungibility is not directly observed, it has been documented for these particular
sectors and increasing conflict fatalities (Strandow 2014, Fezioglu 1998).
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6.3 Hypothesis 3
Using the estimation strategy for testing hypothesis 3 from Section 5.4, I discuss
my preliminary findings.
As seen in Tables 10.7, 10.8, and 10.9, preliminary findings reject hypothesis 3,
for different levels of aid concentration affect conflict violence differently.
Although preliminary findings in hypothesis 1 indicate having at least one aid
project increases the occurrence of conflict events, findings for hypothesis 3 add
caveats. Being in the top quartile of having the largest aid project funds spent
per person significantly reduces conflict events by 64%. The converse, or hav-
ing the 25% lowest of these funds spent per person has an insignificant effect on
conflict violence3 Therefore in order to effectively reduce conflict, policymak-
ers should increase their spending of aid projects per person. Although these
quartiles are relative to the funding of other districts in a given time period, fu-
ture studies could expand on this question further to examine thresholds of aid
spending and their effects on violence.
In fact, aid concentration is found to be significantly parabolic in nature. We ob-
serve at the lowest 20% quantile of aid spending per capita4, that lower levels of
spending increase conflict violence. These lower levels of spending per person
have an effect of significantly increasing conflict events by 255% more compared
3The lower 25% percentile and lowest quantile category excludes districts without any
projects active.
4Again, excluding districts without any projects active
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to districts without any projects. However, as aid concentrations increase to the
3rd quantile, the occurrence of violence only significantly increases by 156%.
However, at the highest level of aid spending per person, the 5th quantile, the
occurrence of violent events is reduced by 58%.
Hypothesis 3 is also rejected when examining aid concentration levels on con-
flict violence as determined by the number of conflict deaths or military and
civilian deaths. Aid concentration quantiles on conflict deaths has a more sta-
tistically significant relationship. The inflection between the third and fourth
quantile of the positive and negative effect of aid per capita spending is ob-
served again. Coefficients for aid concentration levels on military and civilian
deaths parallel sign associations from earlier findings, but are only significant
for the first quantile of aid per capita spending.
Rejecting Hypothesis 3, these findings can provide explanation for the diverging
conclusions in the conflict economics literature concerning the effects of aid on
violence. Here, certain levels of aid project funds per capita have different con-
sequences. For a given period, if low levels of spending per person are present
in a district, these projects may not be effective enough to increase the oppor-
tunity cost for violence. Furthermore, these low levels of spending appear to
do more harm for the perpetration of violence compared to when there are no
projects present at all. Therefore, if policymakers wish to reduce conflict levels,
higher levels of spending per person should be considered which may require
more cross-development initiative coordination.
Other explanations for why higher levels of aid may reduce violence compared
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to lower levels of aid may be due to the level of security oversight of funds.
Projects with lower levels of aid spending, when scaled by population, may be
deemed less valuable to protect. In contrast, projects with high levels of aid
spending may have more security, involvement, and actors in the execution of
projects. With this, the possible rents of these aid project funds become less
desirable.
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CHAPTER 7
ROBUSTNESS TESTING
7.1 Overview
In order to reaffirm the strength or shortfalls of my preliminary findings, I
choose to modify my empirical strategies for hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 by using
a zero-inflated negative binomial model instead of a poisson with random ef-
fects model. The justification for the zero-inflated negative binomial can be seen
in Table 7.1, which illustrates the remediation of adopting this particular estima-
tor. More specific reasons for using a zero-inflated negative binomial model in
reference to shortfalls in my data are discussed to a larger extent in Section 7.2
below.
It should be noted that I conduct estimations using a negative binomial with
random effects model as well, but these findings are not included in this study
for the zero-inflated negative binomial reveal better-fitting results.
Table 7.1: Statistical Problems Alleviated By Various Estimators
Estimation Issue
Estimator Type Over Dispersion Zero Inflation Independence, Multilevel
Poisson, x
Random Effects
Negative Binomial, x x
Random Effects
Zero-Inflated x x x, with robust
Negative Binomial (ZINB) standard errors
This section also includes a discussion for how conclusions for each hypothesis
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are reaffirmed with the new estimator. As seen in Table 7.2 below, the robust-
ness check findings echo earlier preliminary findings in rejection for all three
hypotheses.
Table 7.2: Summary of Preliminary vs. Robustness Test Findings for Hypotheses
Preliminary Robustness Test
Hypothesis Finding Finding
Hypothesis 1: Aggregated aid projects have Rejected Rejected
a positive effect on conflict violence
Hypothesis 2: Different aid-sector-based Rejected Rejected
projects have the same effect on violence
Hypothesis 3: Different levels of aid concentration Rejected Rejected
have the same effect on conflict violence
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7.2 Overdispersion and Zero-Inflation
The dependent variables used in this study violate the mean equals variance
assumption required for unbiased poisson estimations. Examining Figure 7.1
and 7.2 while taking into consideration Tables 4.1-4.4, the data for each of the
count variables is heavily skewed right. For the conflict event data, the variance
of 2.03 is roughly 3 times larger than the mean, .68. Similarly for the conflict
death data, the variance of 58.42 is over 35 times larger than the mean, 1.59.
Additionally, unlike the assumed Poisson distribution, the conflict data has a
much larger than expected number of observed ”zeros.” As seen in Figure 7.1
and 7.2, the data it is ”zero-inflated” which means using a poisson-distribution
based estimator is incorrect.1
These clear violations of the mean equals variance assumptions and thus call
upon searching for a better estimator than the poisson with random effects
model.
Other ways to check for this violation is to compare the estimates of a poisson
with random effects to a negative binomial with random effects regression.2
The two regressions should yield similar results if the mean equals variance
requirement is held. However, I find this not to be the case causing speculation
1Arcand (2010) does not elaborate how this affects his study and does not provide histogram
distributions.
2The negative binomial estimation relaxes the mean-variance requirement, and still is able to
maintain characteristics of the poisson model such as discrete and non-negative events (Haus-
man et al. 1984).
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Figure 7.1: Distribution of Conflict Events
Figure 7.2: Distribution of Conflict Deaths
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of the integrity of my preliminary findings.
Another way to test the strength of the fit of a model, particularly when com-
paring a poisson model, a negative binomial model, or a zero-inflated negative
binomial is to compare its akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC).3 Given the same parameters, smaller values of these
statistics illustrate which estimator is a better fit for the data.
3This is where AIC = −2 · ln(Lˆ)+ 2 · k and BIC = ln(n)k− 2 ln(Lˆ). Here, k stands for the number
of model parameters, Lˆ for maximized value of the likelihood function of the model, and n for
the number of data points.
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7.3 Hypothesis 1
In order to evaluate the strength of my preliminary findings for hypothesis 1,
I replicate my empirical strategy but replace the poisson with random effects
estimator with a zero-inflated negative binomial estimator.
Considered the better fitting model comparing the AIC and BIC values in Tables
10.1-10.3, the zero-inflated negative binomial overwhelmingly rejects Hypothesis
1. Rather than aid provoking more violence, all coefficients associated with the
aggregated aid for my eight estimations are negative and significant or positive
and insignificant.
Development aid, when considered at the aggregate level, actually deters or has
no effect on conflict violence.
Compared to the preliminary result of a 145% increase, the zero-inflated neg-
ative binomial finds that by having at least on development aid project active,
the number of conflict events significantly decreases by 9% (Table 13).
The zero-inflated negative binomial model indicates that the previous estima-
tions may have had biased estimations due to the zero-inflated nature of the
parameters and the variance exceeding the mean of the four dependent vari-
ables.
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7.4 Hypothesis 2
In order to evaluate the strength of my preliminary findings for Hypothesis 2,
I replicate my empirical strategy but replace the poisson with random effects
estimator with a zero-inflated negative binomial estimator.
Echoing earlier findings, the better-fitting zero-inflated negative binomial
model also rejects hypothesis 2. Each aid sector exhibits statistically significant
results for how these aid-sector-based projects affect conflict violence. Conduct-
ing t-tests while comparing the aid-sector coefficients reiterates this finding.A
Different aid-sector-based projects have different effects on violence whereby
the some aid-sector based projects reduce violence or have no effect on violence.
Similar to the preliminary results, the zero-inflated negative binomial estimator
finds having at least one agricultural or water project active in a district signif-
icantly reduces the occurrence of conflict events. Compared to earlier findings
of around 70%, the magnitude of the impact is found to be much smaller at
around 28% (Table 10.4). Also, general budget aid projects significantly reduce
conflict events by 17% as opposed to earlier findings of 50%. As a result, agri-
cultural, water, and general budget projects are overall the most effective at
increasing the opportunity cost to rebel and thus deterring violence. Increas-
ing the number of health or general budget projects reduces the occurrence of
conflict events, but the presence of only one active project has no impact.
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Education projects are ineffective at raising the opportunity cost for they have
a 110% significant positive effect on conflict events. Additionally, education
projects significantly increase the number of conflict deaths. Education projects
are considered rents and perhaps are not effective at raising the opportunity
cost to rebel. Water, health, and general budget projects may be effective in
raising the opportunity cost to rebel for they have a significant negative impact
on conflict deaths (Table 10.5).
It should be noted that the presence of one education, agriculture, water, health,
or general budget project has varying effects on military and civilian deaths
(Table 10.6). Education and health projects significantly reduce the number of
military deaths while energy projects increase the number of military deaths.
Further, water projects significantly reduce the number of civilian deaths.
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7.5 Hypothesis 3
In order to evaluate the strength of my preliminary findings for Hypothesis 3,
I replicate my empirical strategy but replace the poisson with random effects
estimator with a zero-inflated negative binomial estimator.
Echoing earlier findings, the better-fitting zero-inflated negative binomial
model also rejects hypothesis 3. The level of aid per capita has significant and
differing effects on violence.
When a district receives aid spending per capita that is in the bottom 25% per-
centile compared to other districts, it has a significant 49.7% increase in conflict
events. However if a district receives aid spending per capita in the 4th or 5th
percentile, there is a significant decrease in conflict events by 220% and 170%
respectively (Table 10.7).
Examining Tables 10.8 and 10.9, aid concentration has an overwhelming in-
significant impact on the number of conflict deaths, military deaths, and civil-
ian deaths. However these three dependent variables follow the same trend as
before with a parabolic relationship of aid concentration on violence. Coeffi-
cients for lower levels of aid concentration have positive signs and coefficients
for higher levels of aid concentration with negative signs.
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7.6 Additional Checks
In order to effectively reaffirm the strength of my findings I conduct the follow-
ing exercises. I evaluate the strength of conclusions found for Hypothesis 1 by
lagging aggregated aid, examining events where rebels move first, and scaling
violence by population.
7.6.1 Lagging Aggregated Aid and Hypothesis 1
To reaffirm the strength of hypothesis 1, I perform a robustness check where I
lag my three aggregated aid parameters (the having at least one project dummy,
the total number of projects, and the logged total project funds) and regress
them separately on conflict events or conflict deaths.
By doing so, I can see if the treatment of prior aid may have an effect on conflict
and thus further justify the causal strength of the relationship between aid and
conflict. In doing so, I am able to take into consideration time elements which
may delay the impact of development aid on possible conflict or violence. For
instance, rebels may not move to a certain locality in the same month period for
they may not be aware of the existence of a project. Further, citizens may not
reap the benefits of anti-poverty programs in a one month time span.
When lagging the dummy for having had at least one aid project by 3 months,
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6 months, and 12 months, I find that having at least one aid project in any of the
prior time periods reduces conflict fatalities and events, months later. Similarly,
increasing the number of projects or total funds of projects in a prior time pe-
riods reduces conflict fatalities and events, in subsequent time periods months.
These findings do not change, but rather reaffirm the rejection of hypothesis 1.
Earlier in Section 7, I found that having a least one aid project had no impact
on conflict fatalities (Table 10.2). I find in this lagging exercise that having at
least one aid project in a prior time period does have a significant impact on
conflict deaths. Therefore, further considerations for time may be crucial when
considering the effectiveness of aid and which time period to consider when
measuring its impact.
7.6.2 Deaths and Events Where Rebels Move First and Hypoth-
esis 1
Hypothesis 1 is based off an assumption and study that claims rebels initiate
violence in ideological conflict.4 As a result, I check to see if in the case where
rebels are actually the ones initating conflict that hypothesis 1 holds. In order to
do this, I create a new dependent variable for events where rebels are considered
the aggressive side and literally ”move first” or perpetrate conflict.5 I sum the
number of rebel perpetrated events and fatalities from rebel perpetrated events
4Arcand et al. (2010) creates a framework for this and solves the first order condition claim-
ing that the rebel-initiated movements cause development aid to increase violence.
5One of the benefits of the Uppsala Dataset is that it provides this information for each con-
flict event.
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and index them appropriately by district i in month time period t. I then use
these two rebel-initiating variables as new dependent variables and follow the
rest of the empirical strategy for hypothesis 1.
As seen in Table 10.10, having at least one development project present increases
the number of rebel-initiated conflict events, supporting hypothesis 1. Although
the presence of a one aid project induces a significant 125% increase in rebel-
initiated conflict events, there is no significant change in conflict deaths from
these events (Table 10.11).
Overall, aggregated aid either has a positive significant or insignificant effect on
conflict violence. Therefore this supports hypothesis 1 indicated that aid does
increase more violence caused by rebels specifically due to it being seen as a
rent. However overall, aid reduces violence indicating the converse: Govern-
ments are less likely to go to areas with aid projects perhaps due to perceived
stability and the effectiveness of development aid to increase the opportunity
cost to rebel.
7.6.3 Population and Hypothesis 1
I consider the proposition that higher levels of fatalities could be a function of
population size and argue here that this is not the case. It should be noted from
Table 4.5 and Figure 7.3 that there is a little correlation between the population
of a district and the number of conflict events or deaths it endures. Addition-
ally there is little correlation between a district’s total number of development
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projects and its population (Figure 7.4).
Although these estimations are not included in the paper, I re-estimate the em-
pirical strategy for Hypothesis 1 but include the 2001 population in the regres-
sion.
My findings do not change and the population parameter is insignificant. With
the inclusion of this parameter I find for instance that by increasing the number
of aid projects, the number of conflict events significantly decrease.
Figure 7.3: Total Conflict Deaths and Events on 2001 Population (in 10,000s) at
the District-Level
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Figure 7.4: Total Development Projects on 2001 Population (in 10,000s) at the
District-Level
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CHAPTER 8
ROBUST TESTING: TWO STAGE LEAST SQUARES RESULTS
8.1 Overview
To support the strength of my findings from the zero-inflated models and to
determine if they are causal, I further test them with a two least squares (2SLS)
comparison. Here, I do a first stage regression using unbalanced socio-economic
characteristics on the assignment of aid. I then use these predicted aid levels to
then be plugged into my original three zero-inflated negative binomial models
as described in Section 5.
The first stage least squares model differs by the corresponding aid dependent
variable. For instance, the treatment of aid (Y=1, N=0) uses a logistic regression
with random effects, while the total number of aids projects uses a poisson re-
gression with random effects, and lastly the logistic total of aid funds uses a log
linear model with random effects.
The hypotheses 2 and 3 are still are rejected, however the effects found of aid
are differed in the 2SLS model. Hypothesis 1 is found to be inconclusive. For
instance, at the aggregated level although predominately negatively signed,
there is no significant effect of development aid on conflict under the 2SLS zero-
inflated negative binomial model estimation compared to the prior zero-inflated
negative binomial model. Therefore hypothesis 1 cannot be supported or re-
jected as I fail to find evidence in either case. Further all sectors of aid besides
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education, agriculture, and general budget show no effect on conflict violence.
Lastly, the earlier observed effects of aid concentration on conflict violence are
not as prominent in the 2SLS estimation.
A comparison of my hypotheses findings under the preliminary, robustness
testing, and the 2SLS estimations is summarized in Table 8.1. All hypotheses
are still rejected, but many earlier findings such as those discussed above the
significant levels of concentrations on conflict are no longer valid.
Table 8.1: Summary of Preliminary vs. Robustness Test vs. Two-Stage Least
Squares Findings for Hypotheses
Preliminary Robustness Test Two-Stage Least
Hypothesis Finding Finding Squares Testing
Finding
Hypothesis 1: Aggregated aid Rejected Rejected Inconclusive
projects have a positive
effect on conflict violence
Hypothesis 2: Different Rejected Rejected Rejected
aid-sector-based projects have
the same effect on violence
Hypothesis 3: Different levels Rejected Rejected Rejected
of aid concentration have
the same effect on conflict violence
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8.2 Hypothesis 1
Under the 2SLS estimations, the coefficient estimates associated with aggregate
aid: having at least one project, the total number of projects, and the total logged
project funds reveal insignificant coefficients (Tables 10.12-10.14). The estimates
are still negative, besides a positive coefficient relating the number of projects
on conflict death levels. Therefore I fail to find any significant effects that would
support or disprove Hypothesis 1.
One thing to note however is comparing the AIC and BIC values of the zero
inflated negative binomial model and the 2SLS version, they are relatively the
same as compared to the previous poisson with random effects and zero inflated
negative binomial model which had a difference of around 5000. Therefore I am
confident in the fit of the 2SLS estimation and its subsequent results.
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8.3 Hypothesis 2
Under the 2SLS, the significance and signs of coefficients associated with vari-
ous types of aid sectors switches signs and significant levels. As earlier compar-
ing the AIC and BIC values of the 2SLS zero inflated negative binomial model
and the previously estimated zero-inflated negative binomial model, I am con-
fident in the fit of the 2SLS estimation due to the similar criterion values (Tables
10.15-10.17).
The major findings that remain or revealed under the 2SLS estimation are the
following, I can argue that they are causal:
1. Education Projects
Increasing the number of education projects increases conflict deaths
and events
Increasing education aid funds increases the number of conflict deaths
2. Agriculture Projects
Having at least one agriculture project significantly increases conflict
events and civilian deaths
Increasing agriculture aid funds increases the number of conflict
events
3. General Budget Projects
Increasing the total number of projects significantly reduces conflict
events
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Increasing general budget aid funds reduces the number of conflict
events and conflict deaths
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8.4 Hypothesis 3
Under the 2SLS model, most of my previously significant coefficients associated
with concentration became insignificant. Furthermore, I only did 2SLS on the
measures for the dummies of having high concentrations of aid and having low
concentrations of aid. The only significant finding is that higher concentrations
of aid significantly reduce civilian deaths (Table 10.18-10.20).
We still see the inversion of the signs of the coefficients as earlier: there are dif-
fering effects of high concentrations of aid compared to low concentration of aid
on conflict events. Whereby, higher concentrations have a positive coefficient
and lower concentrations of aid have a negative coefficient when regressed with
conflict events. However, these coefficients are insignificant. This inversion of
signs is revealed for military and civilian deaths as well. Higher concentrations
of aid have a negative sign associated with military deaths and civilian deaths
(only coefficient significant). Lastly, lower concentrations of aid have a positive
sign associated with military deaths and civilian deaths.
In contrast to earlier where concentration followed the inversion pattern on con-
flict deaths, the 2SLS regressions reveal both high and low concentrations to
have a negative insignificant effect on conflict deaths.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION
The motivation for this study is to examine the relationship between develop-
ment aid and conflict. In doing so, this study can contribute to the current de-
bate if aid is an encourager or deterrent for violence. The study had three re-
search questions with three corresponding hypotheses regarding the effects of
aggregated aid, sector-based aid, and aid concentration on violence. The study
examined violence by measuring total conflict events, conflict deaths, military
deaths, and civilian deaths.
First the study examined these phenomena using a poission with random effects
model, but then corrected for zero-inflation and overdispersion by adopting a
zero-inflated negative binomial model. Further, the study then tried to establish
causality by comparing the zero-inflated negative binomial model with a 2SLS
estimation having controlled for unbalanced socio-economic factors.
All three hypotheses were not supported or rejected in this study. Development
aid at the aggregate level does not appear to increase violence, but has an in-
significant negative effect on the level of conflict events and military, civilian
and conflict deaths. Ultimately, I fail to find significant support that would sup-
port or disprove Hypothesis 1. Further, various aid sectors affect violence differ-
ently which calls into question the fungibility, quality of execution, and ability
of projects to combat poverty. For instance, education projects and agricultural-
based projects have a significant positive effect on violence, while general bud-
get aid reduce violence. Therefore future studies may be able to delve into the
84
characteristics of these projects as opposed to general budget projects which
significant reduce violence, to understand better aid execution.
One of the most interesting findings indicate that higher levels of aid spending
per capita reduces violence compared to areas with lower levels of aid spend-
ing per capita which experience greater levels of violence. The inversion of the
signs is still found in the 2SLS specification and is significant when looking at
the impact of high concentrations of aid on reducing conflict civilian deaths.
Explanations for this observed phenomena may be due to security oversight or
possible accumulation of resources or coordination of donors. Therefore future
studies may be interested in investigating this inflection point, where a certain
level of aid money per aid recipient may lower violence levels.
Another interesting finding is that although aid is seen to negatively affect vio-
lence, its presence increases the number of rebel-initiated events. Therefore the
effects of aid on a conflict may inherently vary based on the amount rebels ver-
sus governments move. Here, the Nepalese Civil War had more conflict events
initiated by the government, washing out the positive effect aid had on rebel-
originated violence.
Future studies should look into characteristics of aid projects, such as the donor
level or assessments of the quality of aid projects. Additionally, although this
study provides a rich unique dataset of Nepal never before compiled, it could be
strengthened with the incorporation of more exogenous geographical and mete-
orological parameters. These parameters could be considered in future projects
to create stronger findings relating aid and conflict. Being one of the few quan-
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titative studies linking development aid on conflict in Nepal, this study is a
contribution to the hole in the South Asian literature.
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CHAPTER 10
APPENDIX 1: ESTIMATIONS
Hypothesis 1
Below are the estimations examining aggregated aid projects on conflict vio-
lence for Hypothesis 1. The estimations use the empirical strategy outlined in
Section 5.2:
• Table 10.1 Aggregated Aid on Conflict Events
• Table 10.2 Aggregated Aid on Conflict Deaths
• Table 10.3 Aggregated Aid on Military and Civilian Deaths
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Table 10.1: Aggregated Aid on Conflict Events
Poison, Random Effects Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model
Conflict Events
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Any Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) 0.375∗∗∗ -0.0939∗
(10.73) (-2.21)
Total Number of Active -0.00920∗∗∗ -0.00455∗∗∗
Aid Projects (-8.39) (-4.59)
Log Total Active Aid 0.0174∗∗∗ -0.0104∗∗∗
Project Funds (6.73) (-3.45)
Log District GDP 0.350 0.311 0.360 0.151∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(1.05) (0.94) (1.08) (4.02) (3.49) (3.90)
District per capita income -5.559 -6.115 -5.622 -0.745 -1.440 -0.470
(-0.65) (-0.72) (-0.65) (-0.45) (-0.84) (-0.28)
Log District Development Budget -0.116 -0.119 -0.125 -0.0465 -0.0426 -0.0416
(-0.42) (-0.43) (-0.45) (-1.44) (-1.32) (-1.28)
Gini -0.0174 -0.167 -0.0112 0.0000398 -0.0117 -0.0315
(-0.03) (-0.25) (-0.02) (0.00) (-0.15) (-0.40)
Constant -1.177 -0.383 -1.019 0.500 0.580 0.481
(-0.32) (-0.11) (-0.28) (1.15) (1.33) (1.10)
Observations 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796
Districts 69 69 69 69 69 69
AIC 13501.7 13542.8 13573.7 6400.9 6390.0 6393.1
BIC 13548.4 13589.5 13620.3 6460.9 6450.0 6453.1
LL -6743.8 -6764.4 -6779.8 -3191.4 -3186.0 -3187.6
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust Standard Errors, Poisson with random effects for Columns 1a-1c, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial for Columns 2a-2c
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Table 10.2: Aggregated Aid on Conflict Deaths
Poison, Random Effects Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model
Conflict Deaths
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Any Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) 0.426∗∗ 0.0573
(3.19) (0.58)
Total Number of Active -0.00976∗∗∗ -0.00217
Aid Projects (-3.55) (-0.69)
Log Total Active Aid 0.0193∗ -0.000672
Project Funds (2.11) (-0.09)
Log District GDP 0.266 0.210 0.277 0.0184 0.0155 0.0242
(0.94) (0.76) (0.98) (0.20) (0.17) (0.27)
District per capita income -4.826 -5.435 -4.923 -0.0443 -0.213 0.0225
(-1.03) (-1.12) (-1.04) (-0.01) (-0.04) (0.00)
Log District Development Budget -0.256 -0.251 -0.266 -0.165∗ -0.164∗ -0.168∗
(-1.27) (-1.25) (-1.31) (-2.25) (-2.19) (-2.26)
Gini -0.652 -0.855 -0.646 -0.600∗∗ -0.629∗∗ -0.616∗∗
(-1.49) (-1.77) (-1.44) (-2.62) (-2.69) (-2.69)
Constant 3.338 4.201 3.546 4.935∗∗∗ 5.022∗∗∗ 4.993∗∗∗
(1.48) (1.80) (1.55) (4.86) (4.82) (4.86)
Observations 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796
Districts 69 69 69 69 69 69
AIC 36940.5 37062.6 37152.5 9746.9 9746.3 9747.8
BIC 36987.2 37109.3 37199.2 9806.9 9806.3 9807.8
LL -18463.3 -18524.3 -18569.3 -4864.5 -4864.1 -4864.9
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust Standard Errors, Poisson with random effects for Columns 1a-1c, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial for Columns 2a-2c
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Table 10.3: Aggregated Aid on Military and Civilian Deaths
Poison, Random Effects Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model
Conflict Military Civilian Conflict Military Civilian
Deaths Deaths Deaths Deaths Deaths Deaths
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Any Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) 0.426∗∗ 0.446 0.433∗ 0.0573 0.00111 -0.0443
(3.19) (1.50) (2.26) (0.58) (0.01) (-0.36)
Log District GDP 0.266 0.473 0.516∗ 0.0184 0.212 0.349∗∗∗
(0.94) (0.98) (2.03) (0.20) (1.05) (3.95)
District per capita income -4.826 -4.440 -7.604 -0.0443 1.317 -3.460
(-1.03) (-0.69) (-1.83) (-0.01) (0.19) (-0.85)
Log District Development Budget -0.256 -0.296 -0.173 -0.165∗ -0.190 -0.125
(-1.27) (-1.06) (-1.06) (-2.25) (-1.40) (-1.95)
Gini -0.652 -0.842 -0.363 -0.600∗∗ -0.728 -0.285
(-1.49) (-1.05) (-0.59) (-2.62) (-1.38) (-1.09)
Constant 3.338 0.555 -2.131 4.935∗∗∗ 1.948 -0.320
(1.48) (0.23) (-1.03) (4.86) (1.04) (-0.32)
Observations 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796
Districts 69 69 69 69 69 69
AIC 36940.5 8894.8 8815.5 9746.9 3267.1 4821.0
BIC 36987.2 8941.4 8862.2 9806.9 3327.1 4881.0
ll -18463.3 -4440.4 -4400.8 -4864.5 -1624.5 -2401.5
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust Standard Errors, Poisson with random effects for Columns 1a-1c, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial for Columns 2a-2c
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Hypothesis 2
Below are the estimations examining aid-sector-based projects on conflict vio-
lence for Hypothesis 2. The estimations use the empirical strategy outlined in
Section 5.3:
• Table 10.4 Aid Sectors on Conflict Events
• Table 10.5 Aid Sectors on Conflict Deaths
• Table 10.6 Aid Sectors on Military and Civilian Deaths
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Table 10.4: Aid Sectors on Conflict Events
Poison, Random Effects Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model
Conflict Events
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Education Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) 1.502 0.103∗
(1.55) (2.45)
Agriculture Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) -1.122∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗
(-9.94) (-4.22)
Water Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) -0.641∗ -0.287∗∗∗
(-2.40) (-4.36)
Health Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) -1.371∗ -0.305
(-2.16) (-1.45)
General Budget Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) -0.763∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗
(-6.06) (-3.75)
Energy Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) 0.446∗∗∗ -0.0695
(3.40) (-1.66)
Total Number of Active 0.0754 0.00391
Education Projects (1.06) (1.51)
Total Number of Active -1.123∗∗∗ -0.298∗∗∗
Agriculture Projects (-9.28) (-4.13)
Total Number of Active -0.269 -0.237∗∗∗
Water Projects (-0.90) (-4.21)
Total Number of Active -1.510∗∗ -0.386∗
Health Projects (-2.79) (-2.17)
Total Number of Active -0.0144∗∗∗ -0.00316∗
General Budget Projects (-3.42) (-2.51)
Total Number of Active 0.113 -0.112∗∗∗
Energy Projects (1.01) (-3.30)
Log. Total Education Aid 0.117 0.00782∗
Project Funds (1.53) (2.43)
Log. Total Agriculture Aid -0.0848∗∗∗ -0.0237∗∗∗
Project Funds (-9.67) (-4.19)
Log. Total Water Aid -0.0388 -0.0205∗∗∗
Project Funds (-1.92) (-4.52)
Log. Total Health Aid -0.0894∗ -0.0210
Project Funds (-2.28) (-1.60)
Log General Budget Aid -0.0549∗∗∗ -0.0130∗∗∗
Project Funds (-6.07) (-3.87)
Log. Total Energy Aid 0.0399∗∗ -0.00726
Project Funds (2.91) (-1.93)
Constant -3.804 -2.530 -3.835 -0.261 -0.679 -0.350
(-1.56) (-1.39) (-1.62) (-0.56) (-1.28) (-0.74)
Observations 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796
Districts 69 69 69 69 69 69
AIC 12684.9 13025.3 12704.1 6337.3 6340.0 6334.8
BIC 12764.9 13105.3 12784.1 6430.6 6433.4 6428.1
LL -6330.4 -6500.7 -6340.1 -3154.6 -3156.0 -3153.4
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust Standard Errors, Poisson with random effects for Columns 1a-1c, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial for Columns 2a-2c
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Table 10.5: Aid Sectors on Conflict Deaths
Poison, Random Effects Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model
Conflict Deaths
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Education Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) 1.846∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗
(5.45) (3.03) [1em]
Agriculture Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) -1.010∗∗∗ -0.134
(-4.78) (-0.79)
Water Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) -1.303∗∗∗ -0.676∗∗
(-4.15) (-3.19)
Health Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) -2.225∗∗ -1.103∗∗∗
(-3.04) (-4.89)
General Budget Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) -0.911∗∗∗ -0.296∗
(-3.61) (-2.19)
Energy Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) 0.501∗∗∗ -0.0264
(3.78) (-0.29)
Total Number of Active 0.0852∗∗∗ 0.0166
Education Projects (4.39) (1.86)
Total Number of Active -1.037∗∗∗ -0.118
Agriculture Projects (-4.58) (-0.66)
Total Number of Active -0.886∗ -0.468∗∗
Water Projects (-2.13) (-3.19)
Total Number of Active -2.398∗∗∗ -1.149∗∗∗
Health Projects (-3.97) (-6.30)
Total Number of Active -0.0119 -0.00315
General Budget Projects (-1.83) (-0.74)
Total Number of Active 0.0709 -0.195∗
Energy Projects (0.62) (-2.48)
Log. Total Education Aid 0.140∗∗∗ 0.0294∗∗
Project Funds (5.63) (2.88)
Log. Total Agriculture Aid -0.0764∗∗∗ -0.0107
Project Funds (-4.64) (-0.81)
Log. Total Water Aid -0.0863∗∗∗ -0.0478∗∗∗
Project Funds (-3.79) (-3.33)
Log. Total Health Aid -0.146∗∗ -0.0741∗∗∗
Project Funds (-3.22) (-5.43)
Log. General Budget Aid -0.0647∗∗∗ -0.0212∗
Project Funds (-3.71) (-2.08)
Log. Energy Aid 0.0456∗∗∗ -0.00255
Project Funds (3.37) (-0.31)
Constant -0.0563 1.227 -0.171 3.071∗∗ 2.475 2.854∗
(-0.02) (0.61) (-0.08) (2.79) (1.93) (2.49)
Observations 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796
Districts 69 69 69 69 69 69
AIC 33706.3 35000.9 33801.7 9645.5 9666.3 9645.1
BIC 33786.3 35080.9 33881.7 9738.8 9759.6 9738.4
LL -16841.1 -17488.5 -16888.9 -4808.8 -4819.1 -4808.6
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust Standard Errors, Poisson with random effects for Columns 1a-1c, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial for Columns 2a-2c
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Table 10.6: Aid Sectors on Military and Civilian Deaths
Poison, Random Effects Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model
Conflict Military Civilian Conflict Military Civilian
Deaths Deaths Deaths Deaths Deaths Deaths
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Education Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) 1.846∗∗∗ -0.944 1.113 0.384∗∗ -0.720∗∗ 0.119
(5.45) (-0.81) (0.97) (3.03) (-3.21) (0.86)
Agriculture Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) -1.010∗∗∗ -0.380 -0.913∗∗∗ -0.134 0.606 -0.0713
(-4.78) (-1.10) (-4.20) (-0.79) (1.72) (-0.44)
Water Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) -1.303∗∗∗ -0.800 -1.297∗∗∗ -0.676∗∗ -0.573 -0.720∗∗∗
(-4.15) (-1.41) (-3.39) (-3.19) (-1.41) (-4.23)
Health Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) -2.225∗∗ -17.32∗∗∗ -1.174∗∗∗ -1.103∗∗∗ -21.47∗∗∗ -0.439
(-3.04) (-21.37) (-5.36) (-4.89) (-33.62) (-1.17)
General Budget Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) -0.911∗∗∗ -0.461 -0.649∗∗∗ -0.296∗ -0.159 -0.0763
(-3.61) (-1.37) (-3.49) (-2.19) (-0.62) (-0.71)
Energy Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) 0.501∗∗∗ 1.250∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗ -0.0264 0.599∗∗ 0.0360
(3.78) (4.06) (4.11) (-0.29) (3.10) (0.40)
Log District GDP -0.0245 0.233 0.210 -0.0892 0.0925 0.234∗
(-0.09) (0.58) (0.64) (-0.97) (0.50) (2.31)
District per capita income 2.363 -8.248 -3.973 3.325 -2.636 -1.398
(0.53) (-1.01) (-0.62) (0.63) (-0.39) (-0.35)
Log District Development Budget 0.0453 -0.212 0.0731 -0.0177 -0.150 0.00212
(0.23) (-0.75) (0.31) (-0.23) (-1.06) (0.03)
Gini -0.857∗ -1.360 -0.792 -0.760∗∗∗ -1.067∗ -0.480
(-2.08) (-1.62) (-1.36) (-3.41) (-2.11) (-1.75)
Constant -0.0563 1.403 -4.105 3.071∗∗ 2.330 -1.731
(-0.02) (0.43) (-1.54) (2.79) (1.20) (-1.76)
Observations 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796
Districts 69 69 69 69 69 69
AIC 33706.3 8612.9 8471.6 9645.5 3238.8 4805.2
BIC 33786.3 8692.9 8551.5 9738.8 3332.1 4898.5
LL -16841.1 -4294.5 -4223.8 -4808.8 -1605.4 -2388.6
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust Standard Errors, Poisson with random effects for Columns 1a-1c, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial for Columns 2a-2c
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Hypothesis 3
Below are the estimations examining levels of aid concentration on conflict vi-
olence for Hypothesis 3. The estimations use the empirical strategy outlined in
Section 5.4:
• Table 10.7 Aid Concentration on Conflict Events
• Table 10.8 Aid Concentration on Conflict Deaths
• Table 10.9 Aid Concentration on Military and Civilian Deaths
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Table 10.7: Aid Concentration on Conflict Events
Poisson, Random Effects Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model
Conflict Events
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Any Project Present? (Y=1, N=0) 0.375∗∗∗ -0.0939∗
(3.36) (-2.21)
High Concentration? (Y=1, N=0) -1.035∗∗∗ -0.0981
(-4.13) (-1.29)
Low Concentration (Y=1, N=0) -0.0128 0.183∗∗∗
(-0.09) (4.42)
1st quantile of project money 0.936∗∗∗ 0.0672
per capita (6.74) (1.22)
2st quantile of project money 0.289 -0.140∗
per capita a (1.52) (-2.39)
3rd quantile of project money 0.445∗∗ -0.0576
per capita (2.62) (-0.97)
4th quantile of project money -0.252 -0.446∗∗∗
per capita (-1.33) (-6.73)
5th quantile of project money -0.871∗ -0.258∗∗
per capita (-2.14) (-3.17)
Log District GDP 0.350 0.227 0.0541 0.151∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗ 0.0718
(1.78) (1.22) (0.28) (4.02) (2.87) (1.74)
District per capita income -5.559 -0.548 2.194 -0.745 0.331 1.538
(-1.59) (-0.16) (0.61) (-0.45) (0.19) (0.89)
Log. District Development Budget -0.116 -0.117 0.00494 -0.0465 -0.0311 0.0243
(-0.80) (-0.85) (0.04) (-1.44) (-0.95) (0.69)
Gini -0.0174 -0.272 -0.419 0.0000398 -0.0914 -0.119
(-0.05) (-0.78) (-1.10) (0.00) (-1.14) (-1.46)
Constant -1.177 0.266 -0.876 0.500 0.393 -0.171
(-0.68) (0.16) (-0.51) (1.15) (0.88) (-0.37)
Observations 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796
Districts 69 69 69 69 69 69
AIC 13501.7 13466.2 13045.7 6400.9 6381.9 6363.0
BIC 13548.4 13519.5 13119.1 6460.9 6448.6 6449.7
LL -6743.8 -6725.1 -6511.9 -3191.4 -3181.0 -3168.5
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust Standard Errors, Poisson with random effects for Columns 1a-1c, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial for Columns 2a-2c
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Table 10.8: Aid Concentration on Conflict Deaths
Poisson, Random Effects Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model
Conflict Deaths
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Any Project Present? (Y=1, N=0) 0.426∗∗ 0.0573
(3.19) (0.58)
Log. District GDP 0.266 0.160 -0.0656 0.0184 -0.00762 -0.103
(0.94) (0.59) (-0.25) (0.20) (-0.08) (-1.14)
District per capita income -4.826 0.0970 4.224 -0.0443 1.699 4.529
(-1.03) (0.02) (1.02) (-0.01) (0.31) (0.84)
Log. District Development Budget -0.256 -0.272 -0.0874 -0.165∗ -0.162∗ -0.0178
(-1.27) (-1.36) (-0.48) (-2.25) (-2.16) (-0.26)
Gini -0.652 -0.977∗ -1.125∗ -0.600∗∗ -0.723∗∗ -0.748∗∗
(-1.49) (-2.04) (-2.38) (-2.62) (-3.06) (-3.28)
High Concentration? (Y=1, N=0) -1.126∗∗ -0.213
(-3.10) (-0.80)
Low Concentration? (Y=1, N=0) -0.0648 0.136
(-0.31) (1.14)
1st quantile of project money 1.045∗∗∗ 0.266∗
per capita (5.91) (2.13)
2nd quantile of project money 0.414 -0.0515
per capita (1.89) (-0.42)
3rd quantile of project money 0.708∗∗ 0.257
per capita (2.94) (1.39)
4th quantile of project money -0.653∗∗ -0.794∗∗∗
per capita (-2.80) (-5.99)
5th quantile of project money -0.815∗ -0.176
per capita (-2.49) (-0.69)
Constant 3.338 5.053∗ 3.019 4.935∗∗∗ 5.097∗∗∗ 3.130∗∗∗
(1.48) (2.14) (1.52) (4.86) (4.67) (3.31)
Observations 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796
Districts 69 69 69 69 69 69
AIC 36940.5 36749.1 35134.8 9746.9 9739.8 9670.0
BIC 36987.2 36802.4 35208.1 9806.9 9806.5 9756.6
LL -18463.3 -18366.6 -17556.4 -4864.5 -4859.9 -4822.0
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust Standard Errors, Poisson with random effects for Columns 1a-1c, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial for Columns 2a-2c
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Table 10.9: Aid Concentration on Conflict Deaths
Poisson, Random Effects Zero Inflate Negative Binomial
Military Civilian Military Civilian
Deaths Deaths Deaths Deaths
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
High Concentration? (Y=1, N=0) 0.291 -1.320∗ 0.879 -0.367
(0.34) (-2.43) (1.61) (-1.80)
Low Concentration? (Y=1, N=0) 0.416 -0.0897 0.597∗∗ 0.0600
(1.49) (-0.46) (3.02) (0.44)
1st quantile of project money 1.134∗∗∗ 1.008∗∗∗ 0.284 0.0458
per capita (4.04) (4.71) (1.17) (0.40)
2nd quantile of project money 0.514 0.477∗ 0.131 0.0284
per capita (1.40) (2.19) (0.46) (0.23)
3rd quantile of project money -0.494 0.543 -0.657∗ 0.178
per capita (-0.96) (1.52) (-2.17) (0.80)
4th quantile of project money -0.454 -0.463 -0.887∗∗∗ -0.683∗∗∗
per capita (-1.07) (-1.52) (-3.29) (-3.56)
5th quantile of project money 0.0563 -1.052 0.386 -0.420
per capita (0.07) (-1.14) (0.71) (-1.93)
Log. District GDP 0.463 0.391 0.396∗ 0.217 0.280 0.213 0.306∗∗ 0.227∗
(0.98) (0.72) (2.07) (1.04) (1.41) (1.04) (3.15) (2.23)
District per capita income -3.719 -3.064 -1.780 1.048 0.157 0.880 -1.224 1.463
(-0.47) (-0.37) (-0.42) (0.22) (0.02) (0.12) (-0.30) (0.37)
Log. District Development Budget -0.288 -0.255 -0.190 -0.0602 -0.125 -0.0677 -0.120 -0.0116
(-1.10) (-0.76) (-1.33) (-0.39) (-0.86) (-0.43) (-1.87) (-0.16)
Gini -1.017 -1.538 -0.606 -0.812 -0.661 -1.011∗ -0.338 -0.393
(-1.46) (-1.62) (-1.00) (-1.08) (-1.40) (-2.02) (-1.24) (-1.41)
Constant 0.539 0.866 -0.331 -1.624 -0.328 -0.222 -0.102 -1.498
(0.25) (0.30) (-0.16) (-0.62) (-0.18) (-0.11) (-0.10) (-1.43)
Observations 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796
AIC 8920.3 8709.1 8785.2 8566.1 3255.7 3252.6 4817.5 4799.3
BIC 8973.6 8782.4 8838.5 8639.4 3322.4 3339.3 4884.1 4886.0
ll -4452.1 -4343.5 -4384.6 -4272.1 -1617.9 -1613.3 -2398.8 -2386.7
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust Standard Errors, Poisson with random effects for Columns 1a-1c, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial for Columns 2a-2c
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Rebels Move First
Below are the estimations examining the effects of aid on rebel-initiated events
and related deaths using the empirical strategy for hypothesis 1 and discussed
in Section 8.6.3.
Table 10.10: Development Aid and Rebel Initiated Events
Poisson, Random Effects Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model
Conflict Events
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Treatment 0.618∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗
(4.62) (2.90)
Number of -0.0000257 0.0000143
Projects (-0.18) (0.56)
Log Project 0.0290∗∗∗ 0.0136∗∗
Money (4.31) (3.09)
Log District Total 0.737∗∗ 0.741∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗
Income (2.80) (3.35) (2.97) (7.96) (8.03) (8.03)
District per capita -17.74 -17.81 -17.99 -17.58∗ -17.10∗ -17.70∗
Income (-0.29) (-0.27) (-0.28) (-2.29) (-2.20) (-2.33)
Log District -0.218 -0.236 -0.224 -0.193∗∗ -0.200∗∗ -0.198∗∗
Development Budget (-0.30) (-0.33) (-0.31) (-3.07) (-3.13) (-3.16)
Gini 0.568 0.421 0.606 0.401∗ 0.367∗ 0.438∗
(0.63) (0.47) (0.65) (2.36) (2.16) (2.56)
Constant -4.174 -3.365 -4.101 -2.564∗∗ -2.435∗∗ -2.547∗∗
(-0.36) (-0.28) (-0.35) (-2.86) (-2.71) (-2.85)
inflate
treat event -22.20∗∗∗ -21.16∗∗∗ -22.26∗∗∗
(-37.79) (-36.14) (-38.77)
Constant 2.042∗∗∗ 2.073∗∗∗ 2.047∗∗∗
(19.73) (20.52) (19.86)
Observations 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796
Districts 69 69 69 69 69 69
AIC 5658.2 5737.9 5679.5 4581.2 4589.9 4579.7
BIC 5704.8 5784.5 5726.2 4641.2 4649.9 4639.6
LL -2822.1 -2861.9 -2832.8 -2281.6 -2285.9 -2280.8
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust Standard Errors, Poisson with random effects for Columns 1a-1c, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial for Columns 2a-2c
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Table 10.11: Development Aid and Deaths from Rebel Initiated Events
Poisson, Random Effects Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model
Conflict Deaths
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Treatment 0.627∗∗∗ 0.169
(3.77) (1.44)
Number of -0.0000418 -0.0000243
Projects (-0.67) (-0.76)
Log Project 0.0287∗∗∗ 0.00950
Money (3.50) (1.46)
Log District Total 0.810∗∗ 0.810∗∗ 0.819∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗
Income (2.75) (3.01) (2.81) (6.87) (6.72) (6.87)
District per capita -17.62 -17.96 -17.80 -16.48∗ -17.15∗ -16.57∗
Income (-0.49) (-0.43) (-0.47) (-2.48) (-2.33) (-2.50)
Log District -0.251 -0.268 -0.256 -0.226∗∗ -0.229∗∗ -0.228∗∗
Development Budget (-0.41) (-0.46) (-0.42) (-3.03) (-3.01) (-3.06)
Gini 0.745 0.588 0.778 0.573∗∗ 0.554∗∗ 0.598∗∗
(0.97) (0.81) (0.98) (2.92) (2.80) (3.01)
Constant -4.179 -3.299 -4.090 -2.432∗ -2.350∗ -2.433∗∗
(-0.45) (-0.36) (-0.43) (-2.57) (-2.45) (-2.58)
inflate
treat event -27.88∗∗∗ -25.19∗∗∗ -28.26∗∗∗
(-75.16) (-68.57) (-77.54)
Constant 2.056∗∗∗ 2.070∗∗∗ 2.060∗∗∗
(19.08) (19.50) (19.18)
Observations 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796
Districts 69 69 69 69 69 69
AIC 6388.5 6476.9 6416.8 4769.6 4772.6 4769.5
BIC 6435.2 6523.5 6463.4 4829.6 4832.5 4829.5
LL -3187.3 -3231.4 -3201.4 -2375.8 -2377.3 -2375.7
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust Standard Errors, Poisson with random effects for Columns 1a-1c, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial for Columns 2a-2c
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2SLS Estimations
Below are estimations for Hypothesis 1, 2, and 3.
Table 10.12: 2SLS Estimations for the Effect of Aggregated Aid on Conflict
Events
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Models 2SLS Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model
Conflict Events
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Any Project Present? (Y=1, N=0) -0.0939∗ -0.101
(-2.21) (-1.47)
Total Number of Active -0.00455∗∗∗ -0.0369
Aid Projects (-4.59) (-1.24)
Log Total Active Aid -1.76e-09 -0.0291
Project Funds (-1.31) (-1.78)
Log. District GDP 0.151∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(4.02) (3.49) (3.81) (3.76) (3.62) (3.31)
District per capita income -0.745 -1.440 -0.832 0.118 -1.622 0.262
(-0.45) (-0.84) (-0.50) (0.07) (-0.92) (0.15)
Log District -0.0465 -0.0426 -0.0430 -0.0482 -0.0514 -0.0362
Development Budget (-1.44) (-1.32) (-1.33) (-1.48) (-1.59) (-1.08)
Gini 0.0000398 -0.0117 -0.00742 -0.00755 0.0141 -0.0195
(0.00) (-0.15) (-0.09) (-0.09) (0.18) (-0.24)
Constant 0.500 0.580 0.443 0.559 0.726 0.636
(1.15) (1.33) (1.02) (1.28) (1.55) (1.45)
Observations 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796
Districts 69 69 69 69 69 69
AIC 6400.9 6390.0 6405.1 6404.5 6404.6 6402.8
BIC 6460.9 6450.0 6465.0 6464.4 6464.6 6462.8
LL -3191.4 -3186.0 -3193.5 -3193.2 -3193.3 -3192.4
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust Standard Errors, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Estimations for 1a-1c, 2a-2c
are the two stage least squares results using a Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial as found
in Table 11. 2a is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a logistic model of related
socioeconomic variables on receiving aid. 2b is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a
poisson model of related socio-economic variables on the total number of aid projects.
Lastly, 2c is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a logistic model of related socio-
economic variables on the total logistic aid funds allocated.
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Table 10.13: 2SLS Estimations for the Effect of Aggregated Aid on Conflict
Deaths
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Models 2SLS Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model
Conflict Deaths
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Any Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) 0.0573 -0.109
(0.58) (-0.74)
Total Number of Active -0.00217 0.000311
Aid Projects (-0.69) (0.01)
Log Total Active Aid -0.000672 -0.0226
Project Funds (-0.09) (-0.69)
Log District GDP 0.0184 0.0155 0.0242 0.0188 0.0239 0.00927
(0.20) (0.17) (0.27) (0.21) (0.26) (0.10)
District per capita income -0.0443 -0.213 0.0225 1.039 0.00762 0.827
(-0.01) (-0.04) (0.00) (0.18) (0.00) (0.15)
Log District Development Budget -0.165∗ -0.164∗ -0.168∗ -0.170∗ -0.168∗ -0.160∗
(-2.25) (-2.19) (-2.26) (-2.33) (-2.26) (-2.10)
Gini -0.600∗∗ -0.629∗∗ -0.616∗∗ -0.641∗∗ -0.612∗∗ -0.644∗∗
(-2.62) (-2.69) (-2.69) (-2.72) (-2.62) (-2.78)
Constant 4.935∗∗∗ 5.022∗∗∗ 4.993∗∗∗ 5.111∗∗∗ 4.985∗∗∗ 5.142∗∗∗
(4.86) (4.82) (4.86) (5.01) (4.92) (5.06)
Observations 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796
Districts 69 69 69 69 69 69
AIC 9746.9 9746.3 9747.8 9746.7 9747.8 9746.9
BIC 9806.9 9806.3 9807.8 9806.7 9807.8 9806.9
LL -4864.5 -4864.1 -4864.9 -4864.4 -4864.9 -4864.5
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust Standard Errors, Poisson with random effects for Columns 1a-1c, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial for Columns 2a-2c
Robust Standard Errors, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Estimations for 1a-1c, 2a-2c
are the two stage least squares results using a Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial as found
in Table 12. 2a is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a logistic model of related
socioeconomic variables on receiving aid. 2b is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a
poisson model of related socio-economic variables on the total number of aid projects.
Lastly, 2c is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a logistic model of related socio-
economic variables on the total logistic aid funds allocated.
102
Table 10.14: 2SLS Estimations for the Effect of Aggregated Aid on Civilian and
Military Deaths
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Models 2SLS Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model
Conflict Military Civilian Conflict Military Civilian
Deaths Deaths Deaths Deaths Deaths Deaths
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Any Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) 0.0573 0.00111 -0.0443 -0.109 -0.336 -0.0790
(0.58) (0.01) (-0.36) (-0.74) (-1.10) (-0.44)
Log. District GDP 0.0184 0.212 0.349∗∗∗ 0.0188 0.186 0.343∗∗∗
(0.20) (1.05) (3.95) (0.21) (0.93) (3.80)
District per capita income -0.0443 1.317 -3.460 1.039 4.680 -2.752
(-0.01) (0.19) (-0.85) (0.18) (0.64) (-0.60)
Log. District Development Budget -0.165∗ -0.190 -0.125 -0.170∗ -0.191 -0.127∗
(-2.25) (-1.40) (-1.95) (-2.33) (-1.41) (-2.00)
Gini -0.600∗∗ -0.728 -0.285 -0.641∗∗ -0.818 -0.298
(-2.62) (-1.38) (-1.09) (-2.72) (-1.49) (-1.13)
Constant 4.935∗∗∗ 1.948 -0.320 5.111∗∗∗ 2.273 -0.243
(4.86) (1.04) (-0.32) (5.01) (1.19) (-0.24)
Observations 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796
Districts 69 69 69 69 69 69
AIC 9746.9 3267.1 4821.0 9746.7 3265.5 4821.0
BIC 9806.9 3327.1 4881.0 9806.7 3325.5 4880.9
LL -4864.5 -1624.5 -2401.5 -4864.4 -1623.8 -2401.5
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust Standard Errors, Poisson with random effects for Columns 1a-1c, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial for Columns 2a-2c
Robust Standard Errors, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Estimations for 1a-1c, 2a-2c
are the two stage least squares results using a Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial as found
in Table 13. 2a is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a logistic model of related
socioeconomic variables on receiving aid. 2b is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a
poisson model of related socio-economic variables on the total number of aid projects.
Lastly, 2c is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a logistic model of related socio-
economic variables on the total logistic aid funds allocated.
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Table 10.15: 2SLS Estimations for the Effect of Aid Sectors on Conflict Events
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model 2SLS Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model
Conflict Events
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Education Project Active ? (Y=1, N=0) 0.103∗ -0.00891
(2.45) (-1.70)
Agriculture Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) -0.311∗∗∗ 0.0487∗
(-4.22) (2.21)
Water Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) -0.287∗∗∗ -0.00939
(-4.36) (-1.41)
Health Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) -0.305 -0.0000789
(-1.45) (-0.17)
General Budget Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) -0.181∗∗∗ -0.00291
(-3.75) (-0.18)
Energy Project Active? (Y=1, N=0) -0.0695 -0.0911
(-1.66) (-0.26)
Total Number of Active 0.00391 0.00375∗∗∗
Education Projects (1.51) (3.73)
Total Number of Active -0.298∗∗∗ 0.0812
Agriculture Projects (-4.13) (1.56)
Total Number of Active -0.237∗∗∗ -0.0119
Water Projects (-4.21) (-1.23)
Total Number of Active -0.386∗ -0.000293
Health Projects (-2.17) (-0.56)
Total Number of Active -0.00316∗ -0.0410∗
General Budget Projects (-2.51) (-2.06)
Total Number of Active -0.112∗∗∗ -0.152
Energy Projects (-3.30) (-0.85)
Log. Total Education Aid 0.00782∗ 0.0203
Project Funds (2.43) (1.87)
Log. Total Agriculture Aid -0.0237∗∗∗ 0.101∗
Project Funds (-4.19) (2.17)
Log. Total Water Aid -0.0205∗∗∗ -0.0227
Project Funds (-4.52) (-1.67)
Log. Total Health Aid -0.0210 0.0380
Project Funds (-1.60) (0.16)
Log Total General Budget -0.0130∗∗∗ -0.0460∗
Aid Project Funds (-3.87) (-2.14)
Log Total Energy Aid -0.00726 0.0104
Project Funds (-1.93) (0.26)
Constant -0.261 -0.679 -0.350 0.854 0.465 0.715
(-0.56) (-1.28) (-0.74) (1.38) (0.53) (1.09)
Observations 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796
Districts 69 69 69 69 69 69
AIC 6337.3 6340.0 6334.8 6403.8 6385.2 6399.8
BIC 6430.6 6433.4 6428.1 6497.1 6478.6 6493.1
LL -3154.6 -3156.0 -3153.4 -3187.9 -3178.6 -3185.9
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust Standard Errors, Poisson with random effects for Columns 1a-1c, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial for Columns 2a-2c
Robust Standard Errors, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Estimations for 1a-1c, 2a-2c
are the two stage least squares results using a Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial as found
in Table 14. 2a is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a logistic model of related
socioeconomic variables on receiving aid. 2b is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a
poisson model of related socio-economic variables on the total number of aid projects.
Lastly, 2c is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a logistic model of related socio-
economic variables on the total logistic aid funds allocated.
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Table 10.16: 2SLS Estimations for the Effect of Aid Sectors on Conflict Deaths
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model 2SLS Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model
Conflict Deaths
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Education Project Present? (Y=1, N=0) 0.384∗∗ 0.0110
(3.03) (0.76)
Agriculture Project Present? (Y=1, N=0) -0.134 -0.0327
(-0.79) (-0.56)
Water Project Present? (Y=1, N=0) -0.676∗∗ -0.00913
(-3.19) (-0.59)
Health Project Present? (Y=1, N=0) -1.103∗∗∗ 0.00163
(-4.89) (1.24)
General Budget Project Present? (Y=1, N=0) -0.296∗ -0.00246
(-2.19) (-0.07)
Energy Project Present? (Y=1, N=0) -0.0264 -0.636
(-0.29) (-0.63)
Total Number of Active 0.0166 0.00697∗∗∗
Education Projects (1.86) (4.17)
Total Number of Active -0.118 -0.129
Agriculture Projects (-0.66) (-0.97)
Total Number of Active -0.468∗∗ 0.0156
Water Projects (-3.19) (0.72)
Total Number of Active -1.149∗∗∗ 0.00188
Health Projects (-6.30) (1.25)
Total Number of Active -0.00315 -0.0653
General Budget Projects (-0.74) (-1.94)
Total Number of Active -0.195∗ -0.562
Energy Projects (-2.48) (-0.90)
Log. Total Education Aid 0.0294∗∗ 0.0889∗∗
Project Funds (2.88) (2.97)
Log. Total Agriculture Aid -0.0107 -0.0371
Project Funds (-0.81) (-0.31)
Log. Total Water Aid -0.0478∗∗∗ -0.0200
Project Funds (-3.33) (-0.66)
Log. Total Health Aid -0.0741∗∗∗ 0.620
Project Funds (-5.43) (1.00)
Log. Total General Budget -0.0212∗ -0.0967∗
Aid Project Funds (-2.08) (-1.98)
Log Total Energy Aid -0.00255 0.00451
Project Funds (-0.31) (0.04)
Constant 3.071∗∗ 2.475 2.854∗ 4.619∗∗ 2.837 4.487∗∗∗
(2.79) (1.93) (2.49) (3.05) (1.36) (3.50)
Observations 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796
Districts 69 69 69 69 69 69
AIC 9645.5 9666.3 9645.1 9748.7 9720.6 9718.3
BIC 9738.8 9759.6 9738.4 9842.0 9813.9 9811.6
LL -4808.8 -4819.1 -4808.6 -4860.3 -4846.3 -4845.1
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust Standard Errors, Poisson with random effects for Columns 1a-1c, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial for Columns 2a-2c
Robust Standard Errors, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Estimations for 1a-1c, 2a-2c
are the two stage least squares results using a Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial as found
in Table 15. 2a is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a logistic model of related
socioeconomic variables on receiving aid. 2b is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a
poisson model of related socio-economic variables on the total number of aid projects.
Lastly, 2c is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a logistic model of related socio-
economic variables on the total logistic aid funds allocated.105
Table 10.17: 2SLS Estimations for the Effect of Aid Sectors on Civilian and Mili-
tary Deaths
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model 2SLS Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model
Conflict Military Civilian Conflict Military Civilian
Deaths Deaths Deaths Deaths Deaths Deaths
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Education Project Present? (Y=1, N=0) 0.384∗∗ -0.720∗∗ 0.119 0.0110 -0.0347 -0.00945
(3.03) (-3.21) (0.86) (0.76) (-1.35) (-0.69)
Agriculture Project Present? (Y=1, N=0) -0.134 0.606 -0.0713 -0.0327 -0.0489 0.169∗∗
(-0.79) (1.72) (-0.44) (-0.56) (-0.38) (2.61)
Water Project Present? (Y=1, N=0) -0.676∗∗ -0.573 -0.720∗∗∗ -0.00913 -0.0408 0.000206
(-3.19) (-1.41) (-4.23) (-0.59) (-1.33) (0.01)
Health Project Present? (Y=1, N=0) -1.103∗∗∗ -21.47∗∗∗ -0.439 0.00163 0.00550∗ 0.000956
(-4.89) (-33.62) (-1.17) (1.24) (2.19) (0.73)
General Budget Project Present? (Y=1, N=0) -0.296∗ -0.159 -0.0763 -0.00246 -0.0910 -0.0577
(-2.19) (-0.62) (-0.71) (-0.07) (-1.63) (-0.81)
Energy Project Present? (Y=1, N=0) -0.0264 0.599∗∗ 0.0360 -0.636 0.781 0.110
(-0.29) (3.10) (0.40) (-0.63) (0.48) (0.09)
Log. District GDP -0.0892 0.0925 0.234∗ -0.0118 0.0168 0.162
(-0.97) (0.50) (2.31) (-0.09) (0.05) (1.09)
District per capita income 3.325 -2.636 -1.398 3.882 -24.95 -14.70
(0.63) (-0.39) (-0.35) (0.51) (-1.93) (-1.53)
Log. District Development Budget -0.0177 -0.150 0.00212 -0.145 0.0645 -0.132
(-0.23) (-1.06) (0.03) (-1.66) (0.39) (-1.76)
Gini -0.760∗∗∗ -1.067∗ -0.480 -0.653∗ -1.487∗∗ -0.401
(-3.41) (-2.11) (-1.75) (-2.51) (-2.68) (-1.22)
Constant 3.071∗∗ 2.330 -1.731 4.619∗∗ -0.928 2.016
(2.79) (1.20) (-1.76) (3.05) (-0.35) (1.40)
Observations 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796 5796
Districts 69 69 69 69 69 69
AIC 9645.5 3238.8 4805.2 9748.7 3254.6 4811.4
BIC 9738.8 3332.1 4898.5 9842.0 3347.9 4904.7
LL -4808.8 -1605.4 -2388.6 -4860.3 -1613.3 -2391.7
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust Standard Errors, Poisson with random effects for Columns 1a-1c, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial for Columns 2a-2c
Robust Standard Errors, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Estimations for 1a-1c, 2a-2c
are the two stage least squares results using a Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial as found
in Table 16. 2a is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a logistic model of related
socioeconomic variables on receiving aid. 2b is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a
poisson model of related socio-economic variables on the total number of aid projects.
Lastly, 2c is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a logistic model of related socio-
economic variables on the total logistic aid funds allocated.
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Table 10.18: 2SLS Estimations for the Effect of Aid Concentration on Conflict
Events
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model 2SLS Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model
Conflict Events
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Any Project Present? (Y=1, N=0) -0.0939∗ -0.101
(-2.21) (-1.47)
High Concentration? (Y=1, N=0) -0.0981 0.00617
(-1.29) (0.14)
Low Concentration? (Y=1, N=0) 0.183∗∗∗ -0.00483
(4.42) (-1.13)
Log. District GDP 0.151∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.0983
(4.02) (2.87) (3.76) (1.73)
District per capita income -0.745 0.331 0.118 -0.537
(-0.45) (0.19) (0.07) (-0.32)
Log. District Development Budget -0.0465 -0.0311 -0.0482 -0.0347
(-1.44) (-0.95) (-1.48) (-1.04)
Gini 0.0000398 -0.0914 -0.00755 -0.0449
(0.00) (-1.14) (-0.09) (-0.31)
Constant 0.500 0.393 0.559 0.621
(1.15) (0.88) (1.28) (1.16)
Observations 5796 5796 5796 5796
Districts 69 69 69 69
AIC 6400.9 6381.9 6404.5 6407.8
BIC 6460.9 6448.6 6464.4 6474.4
LL -3191.4 -3181.0 -3193.2 -3193.9
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust Standard Errors, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Estimations for 1a-1b, 2a-2b
are the two stage least squares results using a Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial as found
in Table 17. 2a is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a logistic model of related so-
cioeconomic variables on receiving aid. 2b is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a
logistic model of related socioeconomic variables on receiving high or low concentra-
tions of aid.
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Table 10.19: 2SLS Estimations for the Effect of Aid Concentration on Conflict
Deaths
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model 2SLS Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model
Conflict Deaths
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Any Project Present? (Y=1, N=0) 0.0573 -0.109
(0.58) (-0.74)
High Concentration? (Y=1, N=0) -0.213 -0.00690
(-0.80) (-0.08)
Low Concentration? (Y=1, N=0) 0.136 -0.00249
(1.14) (-0.26)
Log. District GDP 0.0184 -0.00762 0.0188 0.00251
(0.20) (-0.08) (0.21) (0.02)
District per capita income -0.0443 1.699 1.039 0.194
(-0.01) (0.31) (0.18) (0.04)
Log. District Development Budget -0.165∗ -0.162∗ -0.170∗ -0.161∗
(-2.25) (-2.16) (-2.33) (-2.03)
Gini -0.600∗∗ -0.723∗∗ -0.641∗∗ -0.618
(-2.62) (-3.06) (-2.72) (-1.88)
Constant 4.935∗∗∗ 5.097∗∗∗ 5.111∗∗∗ 5.018∗∗∗
(4.86) (4.67) (5.01) (4.16)
Observations 5796 5796 5796 5796
AIC 9746.9 9739.8 9746.7 9749.7
BIC 9806.9 9806.5 9806.7 9816.3
LL -4864.5 -4859.9 -4864.4 -4864.8
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust Standard Errors, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Estimations for 1a-1b, 2a-2b
are the two stage least squares results using a Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial as found
in Table 18. 2a is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a logistic model of related so-
cioeconomic variables on receiving aid. 2b is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a
logistic model of related socioeconomic variables on receiving high or low concentra-
tions of aid.
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Table 10.20: 2SLS Estimations for the Effect of Aid Concentration on Civilian
and Military Deaths
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model 2SLS Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model
Military Civilian Military Civilian
Deaths Deaths Deaths Deaths
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
High Concentration (Y=1, N=0) 0.291 -1.320∗ -0.0190 -0.0266∗
(0.34) (-2.43) (-0.84) (-2.00)
Low Concentration (Y=1, N=0) 0.416 -0.0897 0.304 0.0433
(1.49) (-0.46) (1.76) (0.46)
Log. District GDP 0.463 0.396∗ -0.0862 0.0734
(0.98) (2.07) (-0.26) (0.43)
District per capita income -3.719 -1.780 2.584 -1.346
(-0.47) (-0.42) (0.37) (-0.32)
Log. District Development Budget -0.288 -0.190 -0.158 -0.0584
(-1.10) (-1.33) (-1.05) (-0.86)
Gini -1.017 -0.606 -1.554∗ -0.585
(-1.46) (-1.00) (-2.09) (-1.42)
Constant 0.539 -0.331 3.936 0.533
(0.25) (-0.16) (1.70) (0.41)
Observations 5796 5796 5796 5796
Districts 69 69 69 69
AIC 8920.3 8785.2 3264.5 4813.7
BIC 8973.6 8838.5 3331.1 4880.4
LL -4452.1 -4384.6 -1622.2 -2396.9
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust Standard Errors, Poisson with random effects for Columns 1a-1c, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial for Columns 2a-2c
Robust Standard Errors, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Estimations for 1a-1b, 2a-2b
are the two stage least squares results using a Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial as found
in Table 19. 2a is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a logistic model of related so-
cioeconomic variables on receiving aid. 2b is the 2SLS estimation where the FSLS is a
logistic model of related socioeconomic variables on receiving high or low concentra-
tions of aid.
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CHAPTER 11
APPENDIX 2: LIST OF VARIABLES
• Conflict Data
– Conflict Events
– Conflict Deaths
– Military Deaths
– Civilian Deaths
• Development Data
– Aggregated Aid
∗ Aggregated Aid Dummy
∗ Number of Aggregated Total Aid Projects
∗ Money
– Education Aid
∗ Education Aid Dummy
∗ Number of Education Aid Projects
∗ Money Education
– Agriculture Aid
∗ Agriculture Aid Dummy
∗ Number of Agriculture Aid Projects
∗ Agriculture Money
– Water and Sanitation Aid
∗ Water and Sanitation Aid Dummy
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∗ Number of Water and Sanitation Aid Projects
∗ Water and Sanitation Money
– Health Aid
∗ Health Aid Dummy
∗ Number of Health Aid Projects
∗ Health Money
– General Budget Aid
∗ General Budget Aid Dummy
∗ Number of General Budget Aid Projects
∗ General Budget Money
– Energy Aid
∗ Energy Aid Dummy
∗ Number of Energy Aid Projects
∗ Energy Aid Money
• Socio-Economic Data
– 2001 Population
– Log District-level GDP (in million Nepalese Rupees)
– District-level per capita GDP (in million Nepalese Rupees)
– District Share of the Total Regular Budget Expenditures (%)
– District Share of the Total Development Budget Expenditures (%)
– Log. District Development Budget Expenditure
– Share of households whose head is female (%)
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– Share of households whose head is married (%)
– Share of households whose head has an elementary school education
(%)
– Share of households whose head has a secondary school education
(%)
– Share of households whose head is a civil servant (%)
– Share of households who own their home (%)
– Share of households who are employed (%)
– Share of households whose major source of income is wages (%)
– Share of households whose major source of income is through
agriculture-based activities (%)
– District-level contraceptive rate: Number of fertile couples using a
contraceptive method per 100 married women of reproductive age
– Gini Index: Capturing the average size of operational land holding
and inequality in the distribution of the land holding
– Share of district that is Chettry (%)
– Share of district that is Brahmin (%)
– Share of households who own a car (%)
– Share of households who own a telephone (%)
– Share of households who own a bicycle (%)
– Share of households who own a motorcycle (%)
• Month Time Period Dummies
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Appendix 3: T-tests of Socioeconomic Characteristics on Aid
Treatment
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